BRAHMA SUTRAS The systematic Vedanta of Shankara, in commentary on the aphorisms of Badarayana Translated by Swami Vireswarananda (1936) Source: Advaita Ashrama, Mayavati — https://archive.org/details/brahmasutras_SV Swami Vireswarananda's 1936 translation, with the Sanskrit text, word-for-word translation, English rendering, and comments, published by Advaita Ashrama, Mayavati. Distributed under the Ramakrishna Order's long-standing policy permitting free reproduction of its translations of foundational texts for non-commercial spiritual study. Lightly modernised by Soul Spirit Self. ====================================================================== What follows is the complete text of the Brahma Sutras of Badarayana, with Sankara's interpretation, in Swami Vireswarananda's 1936 translation (Mayavati: Advaita Ashrama). The work runs to four chapters of four sections each — 555 sutras systematising the Upanishadic teaching that Sankara's commentary then unfolds. This edition gives the Sanskrit sutra, a word-for-word gloss, a running English translation, and Vireswarananda's notes drawing on Sankara's bhasya. Archaic English verb forms and pronouns have been lightly modernised; OCR artifacts and Devanagari-only lines have been removed. -WITH TEXT, WORD-FOR-WORD TRANSLATION, ENGLISH RENDERING, COMMENTS AND INDEX By SWAMI VIRESWARANANDA _ ADVAITA ASHRAMA MAVAVATI, ALMORA, HIMALAYAS Published by SwaMI VIRESWARANANDA ADVAITA ASHRAMA Mayavatt, Almora ALI, RIGHTS RESERVED COPYRIGHT REGISTERED UNDER ACT XX OF 1847 PRINTED BY N. MUKHERJEE, B.A. AT THE ART PRESS 20, BRITISH INDIAN STREET careuTra, (InDIA) PREFACE Some centres of the Ramakrishna Order have dor some years past been bringing out important scriptures of the Hindus with text, word for word sendcring, running translation and notes based on uthoritative commentaries, in order to make them ‘accesible to the English-knowing public whose knowledge of Sanskrit is limited. The Bhagavad- Gita by Swami Swarupananda published by the Advaita Ashrama, Mayavati, and eight major Upanishads by Swami Sharvananda published by the Ramakrishna Math, Madras, have already become popular. An edition of the Brahma-Sutras on similar lines was over-due. The present work is intended to fulfil this want and to complete in this series the Prasthanatraya according to the inter- pretations of Sankara. The word for word translation is very literal, but the running translation is made as literal as possible consistent with easy reading. In some places the translation of quotations from the Upanishads are taken from Max Miiller’s edition of the Upanishads and the quotations of the Sri Bhashya from Dr. Thibaut’s edition of the book (Sacred Books of the East Series), both with slight adaptations. It is hoped the volume will be a fitting cont: panion to the other Sanskrit works published by the Ramakrishna Order. | S.V. ADVAITA ASHRAMA MAYAVATI, HIMALAYAS November 25, 1936 CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION sis sae es | ADHYASA OR SUPERIMPOSITION aa ee 3 CHAPTER I --------- Section: 1 — ee?.. =. Section 11 aa ont... 66 Section II ae =.. 92 Section Iv ee 324... 180 CHaptTer II Section I ae es.. 158 Section Ii sss s... 198 Section 11 ite ios.. 28) Section IV ae sa... 270 CuaptTer III Section I bi ey 287 Section 1 — we ah 809 Section II sii me.. 844 Section Iv ng a.» 407 Cyapter IV Section I Section II Section 11 Section Iv Index Ac 7 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Ait.... Aitareya Upanishad. Ait. Ar..... Aitareya Aranyaka. Brih.... Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. Chh..... Chhandogya Upanishad. Kath.... Katha Upanishad. Kau.... Kausitaki Upanishad. Mbh.... Mahabharata. Mai.... Maitrayani Upanishad. Mu.... Mundaka Upanishad. Pr.... Prasna Upanishad. Svet.... Svetasvatara Upanishad. Taitt.... Taittirrya Upanishad. INTRODUCTION THE SIX SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY The Vedas are the scriptures of the Hindus, to whatever sect or denomination they may belong. They are the earliest extant religious literature to-day and form the corner-stone of the Indo-Aryan cultural edifice. The Hindus believe that the Vedas are not the utterances of any person but are eternal and owe their authority to no individual. They are not inspired but expired by God. These Vedas are divided into two sections, the Karmakanda and the Jnanakanda, the former dealing with the ritualistic and the latter with the knowledge portion of the Vedas. The latter section is also known as the Vedanta, the end of the Vedas or the goal or gist of the Vedas. These are not mere speculations but the record of the spiritual experiences of the race for centuries, actual realizations or superconscious per- ceptions. Though we find Vedantic thought even in some of the earliest hymns of the Rig-Veda, e.g. the Nasadiya Sukta, which forms as it were the basis of later Upanishads, yet there is no denying the fact that the Indo-Aryans in their earlier days in India were given more to rituals and sacrifices. These were elaborated to such an extent by the Brahmanas, the priestly class, that persons of rationalistic bent of ii BRAHMA-SUTRAS mind revolted and questioned the very efficacy of the sacrificial religion. They engaged themselves in metaphysical problems and arrived at different solu- tions of the world. The Vedantic thought that was in germ form was now developed more and more, ard we have the Upanishads. This spirit of revolt against ritualism was carried on mainly by the Kshatriyas. The Indo-Aryans were very bold thinkers and nothing was sacrilegious to them in their search after truth. Traces of opposition against the religion cf the Vedas are found in the Vedas themselves. This tidal wave of rationalism in its extreme form gave rise to such schools of thought as the Charvakas, which were extremely materialistic and anti-religious. In the age immediately preceding Buddha and during his lifetime there was a great religious and philosophical upheaval in India. From the Brahma- jala-Sutras we learn that in his time there were as many as sixty-two different schools of philosophy in India. We also learn from Buddhistic literature the names of a good number of teachers who were vener- ated in Aryadvarta at the time—names like Purina Kasyapa, Katyayana, Makkah Gosala, Nigantha Nathaputra, the founder of Jainism, and _ others. While these great souls represented Indian culture from an anti-Vedic standpoint there were many great names that represented the culture from the tradi- tional standpoint—names that are still venerated by Hindu religion and culture. INTRODUCTION lil The destructive criticism of everything in the old system by the Charvakas and others set the orthodox section to organize their belief on a more rationalistic basis and render it immune against all such criticism. This led to the foundation of the six systems of orthodox Hindu philosophy—orthodox' in the sense that they accepted the autuority of the Vedas in things transcendental-—while there were others who did not accept this authority and therefore were dubbed heterodox, though otherwise they too were the out- come of Upanishadic thought. The acceptance of the authority of the Vedas by these orthodox schools, however, does not mean that they accepted them in toto. Their allegiance to the Vedas varied widely and often it was too loose. Of the six orthodox schools, wiz. Nyaya, Vaiseshika, Sankhya, Yoga, Purva Mimamsaé and Uttara Mimamsa or Vedanta, the last two are intimately connected with the Vedas, which is one of the reasons why they are not mention- ed in the Jaina and Buddhistie literature, while the others are mentioned. These six orthodox systems of thought developed side by side at different intellectual centres, of which there were a good number all over the country even during the Upanishadic period. Again in each system there were shades of difference. Thus for centuries philosophic thought developed in India till at last it ' Astika (orthodox) and Nastika (heterodox) had nothing to do with belief or non-belief in the existence of a God.; Sankhya and Mimamsa which did not accept an Iswara were yet regarded Astika (orthodox). lv BRAHMA-SUTRAS became so unwieldy that a regular systematization of each school of thought was found a great necessity. This led to the Sutra literature. THE SUTRAS These systematic treatises were written in short aphorisms called Sutras, meaning clues, and were intended as memory-aids to long discussions on any topic which the student had gone through with his teacher or Guru. The thought was very much condensed, for much was taken for granted. Conse- quently the maximum of thought was compressed into these Sutras in as few words as possible. Madhwa- charya quotes from Padma Purana a definition of the Sutra in his commentary on the Brahma-Sutras which runs as follows: HemaAMaienst anNagangay | weaaaaa 4 ai qafaal fag: ‘“‘People learned in Sutra literature say that a Sutra should be concise and unambiguous, give the essence of the arguments on a topic but at the same time deal with all aspects of the question, be free from repeti- tion and faultless.”” Though this definition states what a Sutra ought to be, in practice, however, the desire for brevity was carried to such extremes that most part of the Sutra literature is now unintelligible, and this is particularly so with respect to the Vedanta- Sutras which has consequently given rise to divergent systems. INTRODUCTION Vv There was Sutra literature in every branch of Indo-Aryan knowledge which had become cumbrous through centuries and required systematization. The authors of these Sutras, as we see, are not. the founders of the thought or systems they propounded, but are mere systematizers of the thought developed on the subject by successive generations of thinkers for centuries. The thought of these Sutras was much developed by later thinkers and even modified by them, though all of them disclaimed any originality in it, declaring that they were mercly interpreting the Sutras. This was specially the case with respect to the philosophical Sutras. All these subsequent thinkers belonged to one or other of the six systems and developed its traditionary thought from genera- tion to generation, rendering it more and more per- fect, and more and more secure against the ever new criticisms of rival schools. Such interpretations of the Sutras yave rise to various kinds of Ihterary writings like Vakvas, Vrittis, Karikis and Bhashyas, each of them being more and more elaborate than the previous ones. THE BRATIMA-SUTRAS The Upanishads do not contain any ready-made consistent system of thought. At first sight they secm to be full of contradictions. Hence arose the necessity of systematizing the thought of the Upanishads. Badardyana, to whom the authorship of the Rrahma-Sutras or Vedanta-Sutras is ascribed, vi BRAHMA-SUTRAS is not the only one who had tried to systematize the philosophy of the Upanishads. From the Brahma- Sutras itself we find that there were other schools of Vedanta which had their own following: We find the names of Audulomi, Kasakristna, Badari, Jaimini, Karshnajini, Asmarathya and others mentioned. All this shows that Badaradyana’s Sutras do not constitute the only systematic work in the Vedanta school, though probably the last and best. All the sects of India now hold this work to be the great authority and every new sect starts with a fresh commentary on it —without which no sect can be founded in this country. THE AUTHOR AND DATE OF THE SUTRAS About Badarayana, the author of the Sutras, very little is known to-day. Tradition, however, identifies him with Vyasa, the author of the Gita and the Mahabharata. Sankara, however, in his com- mentaries refers to Vydsa as the author of the Maha- bharata, and the author of the Sutras he refers to as Badaradyana. Perhaps to him these two personalities were different. His followers, Vachaspati, Anandagiri and others identify Vyasa and Badarayana, while Ramanuja and other commentators on the Sutras attribute it to Vyasa. Deussen infers from the cross references in the works of Jaimini and Badarayana that they may have been combined by a later editor into one work, and provided with the cross references. INTRODUCTION vil This combined work, he says, was commented upon by Upavarsha on whose work the commentaries of Sabara on the Purva Mimaémsa and Sankara on the Uttara Mimamsa rest. Sankara’s commentary on 3.3.53 gives support to this last view and it also explains the popular idea that the two Mimamsias form one Sdstra. This combined work might well have been arranged by Vyasa, the author of the Mahabharata. Or it may be that he had written them himself according to the views that were tradi- tionally handed down as Badardyana’s. This latter view easily accounts for the reference to Badardyana by name in the Sutras. That such a thing was not uncommon in ancient India is established by Cole- brook on the authority of Indian commentators of Manu and Yajnavalkya.’| Max Miller also says that Badarfyana and other similar names are simply eponymous heroes of different philosophies.’ In support of the view that the two persons are one it can be pointed out that there existed in the time of Panini Sutras known as Bhikshu-Sutras which are identified by Vachaspati with the Vedanta-Sutras. The subject-matter of the Vedanta-Sutras being Brahman, the knowledge of which is pre-eminently meant for Sannyasins, it might well be called Bhikshu- Sutras. Panini in his Sutras ascribes these Bhikshu- Sutras to Pardsarya, the son of Parasara, 7t.c. Veda- Vyasa, who was also calicd Badaradyana as he had his "The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy (1912 Impres- Vili BRAHMA-SUTRAS Ashrama at Badari in the Himalayas. That the Vedanta-Sutras and Purva Mimamsa-Sutras must have existed before Panini can also be inferred from the commentary on both of them by Upavarsha who is said to be the Guru of Panini in the Kathi-saut- sigar, though we must admit it cannot be conclusive- ly proved that the two Upavarshas are one and the same person. The identity of the Vedanta-Sutras and_ the Bhikshu-Sutras would no doubt fix the date of the Sutras very early, before Buddha, and a question may arise how such an early work could have referred to various other schools of philosophy of a much later date and refuted them. In this connection we must not forget that the author of the Sutras does not refer to any founder of the different schools by name. He even does not use the technical terms of the different schools as they are known to us to-day. During that great philosophical ferment which followed at the close of the Upanishadic period various metaphysical views were held which later developed in definite channels. Therefore the fact that Badarayana 1s acquainted with certain systems of thought which later came to be associated with certain names does not show that Badarayana was later than these persons. These later names were by no means the original founders of these systems of thought, but only gave definite shape to some particular thought that was found in that mass of philosophical specula- tions which existed in that period. Badarayana could INTRODUCTION ix anticipate even the Buddhistic and Jaina schools, for Buddha and Mabavira also were not the founders of any altogether new schools of philosophy but imbibed much of the thought current in the country at the time. There was no revolutionary departure in their philosophy, but it was their great personality that shaped the history of India for centuries. As regards Jaina thought we know definitely that it existed from even before the tire of Parswanath (8th or 9th century B. C.). In fact all these systems must have belonged to the same period of philosophical ferment which preceded the rise of Buddhism. Thus a writer of the Vedanta-Sutras before Buddha may well be acquainted with the different schools of philosophy refuted in the Tarkapdda of that book, though they might not have existed in the form in which we know them to-day or in the form in which they have been refuted by Sankara. Moreover, that the Vedanta-Sutras were known to exist’ before Buddha can also be made out from the Gita. The date of the Gita and the original Mahabharata, of which the Gita is a part, can be fixed before the time of Buddha. Both of them are pre-Buddhistic. for they contain no reference to Buddha and Buddhism. Quotations from both are found in Bodhayana who belongs to 400 B.C. The language of the Git4 also seems to belong to a period before Panini. He is also conversant with the epic characters. So we can well say that the GitA and the Mahabharata were known before Buddha. Now we x BRAHMA-SUTRAS find a clear reference to the Brahma-Sutras, in Git& 18.4, where the word ‘Brahma-Sutra-padaih’ occurs. This is a definite reference to the Vedanta-Sutras. The full text runs as follows: ‘‘This has been sung by the Rishis in various ways and in different metres. and definitely and logically by the words of the that the first half refers to teachings which are dis- connected and unsystematic and therefore refers to the Upanishads, while the later half to something definite and logical—a difference that is clearly brought out by this stanza and therefore refers to the systematized thought in the Vedanta-Sutras. Max Miller too is of opinion that the Vedanta-Sutras belong to an earlier period than the Gita' and in the text just quoted he finds a clear reference to the recognized title of the Vedanta or Brahma-Sutras. Indian commentators on the Gita like Ramanuja, Madhwa and others identify the Vedanta-Sutras in this passage of the Gita. But if the Vedanta-Sutras be of an earlier date than the Gita, how could it contain references to the Gita? In Sutras 2.3.45 and 4.2.21 all the com- mentators quote the same text of the Gita, and there seems to be no doubt that they are right. These cross references show that the author of the Gita had a hand in the present recension of the Sutras. This is also made clear by the rejection of the fourfold "The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 113. INTRODUCTION xi Vyuha of the Bhigavatas both by the Gita and the Sutras: and the great predominance given to the Sankhya school in both. The Gita accepts the Sankhya view of creation but modifies it to some extent and makes the Pradhana subservient to the Supreme Brahman which is non-dual. In_ the Vedanta-Sutras also the author refutes the dualism of the Sankhyas. Otherwise he has no objection to accepting the Pradhana or Frakriti as a principle dependant on the Supreme Lord (vide 1. 4. 2-8). Sankara in his Bhashya on these Sutras makes this quite clear. From what has bcen said above we find that there are strong grounds for believing that the Vedanta- Sutras must have existed before Buddha and that if Badarayana and Veda-Vyaésa are not one and the same person as tradition holds, the latter must have had a hand in the present recension of the Sutras, though it is very difficult to say to what extent— whether it was by way of merely revising the original Sutras of Badarfyana or writing them down in toto after the teachings of Badarayana. COMMENTATORS ON THE BRAHMA-SUTRAS It has already been shown that the Brahma- Sutras of Badaradyana somehow gained prominence and popularity and as a result all the great Acharyas have written commentaries on it. The oldest of the extant commentaries 1s by Sankara, the exponent of Monism. A. Vritti by Upavarsha is mentioned by Xi BRAHMA-SUTRAS Sankara and Bhaskara and a Vritti by Bodhayana is referred to and often quoted by Ramanuja in his Sri Bhashya. Sankara does not refer to Bodhayana. According to Vedanta Desika the two are one person. Unfortunately this work of Bodhiyana is not avail- able now. Ramanuja quotes also from the Dramida Bhashya which evidently belongs to the Bhakti cult of Southern India. Sankara was followed by a host of commentators on these Sutras—Yadava Prakasha, Bhaskara, Vijnana Bikshu, Ramianuja, Nilakantha, Sripati, Nimbarka, Madhwa, Vallabha and Baladeva There are even some recent commentaries, though of not much value. All these try to maintain that their system is the one that Badaradyana propounded through his Sutras. At present, however, only five of these great commentators have a large following—Sankara, the exponent of Monism; Ramanuja, the exponent of Visishtadvaita or qualified Monism; Nimbarka, the exponent of Bhedibhcdavada or the theory of differ- ence and non-difference; Madhwa, the exponent of Dualism; and Vallabha, the exponent of Suddhad- vaitavada. All of these systems seem to be based on the views of one or other of the ancient Vedanta schools which we find Badarayana referring to in his Sutras. A question may be raised how the same work could have given rise to so many conflicting schools of thought. The reasons are many. In the first place the brevity of the Sutras leaves much to be supplied INTRODUCTION xin by the commentators, and in the absence of an universally accepted unbroken tradition each is free to do this according to his own pre- conceived ideas. Sumetimes even without supply- ing anything the same Sutra is capable of being interpreted differently and even conveying quite the opposite meaning (e.g. Senkara and Ramaénuja on 3.2.11) by the mere shifting of the stops. Again, while there is a tradition which is accepted more or less by all as regards the arrangement into chapters and sections, there is no such accepted tradition as regards the division into Adhikaranas (topics), nor is there anything authoritative to guide us as to which Sutras form the Purvapaksha or the prima facie view and which give the Siddhanta or the author’s view. So every one is_ free to divide the Sutras into topics according to his own choice and regard any Sutras as giving the author’s view. Then again, the Sutras do not give any reference as to which texts of the scriptures are being discussed and as a result the commentator is free to select any texts from that vast repertory, so much so that it often happens that different com- mentators see different topics discussed in the same set of Sutras. Added to all this is the difficulty that Badarayana is often silent as regards his own decision and that on fundamental questions. He merely gives the views of different Vedantins and ends the topic The five great commentators more or less agree XiV BRAHMA-SUTRAS on certain points, especially where the author attacks the principles of the non-Vedantic schools. All of them agree that Brahman is the cause of this world and that knowledge of It leads to final emancipation which is the goal to be attained; also that Brahman ean be known only through the scriptures and not through mere reasoning. But they differ amongst themselves as to the nature of this Brahman, Its causality with respect to this world, the relation of the individual soul to It and the condition of the soul in the state of release. Brahman according to Sankara is attributeless, immutable, Pure Intelligence. Iswara according to him is a product of Maya—the highest reading of the Nirguna Brahman by the individualized soul. The world is a Vivarta or apparent transformation through Maya of the Nirguna Brahman but not in reality. The Jiva in reality is all-pervading and identical with Brahman, though as individualized by its Upadhi (adjunct), the internal organ, it regards itself as atomic, as an agent, and as a part of the Lord. The knowers of the Nirguna Brahman attain It directly and have not to go by “‘the path of the gods’’. It is the knowers of the Saguna Brahman that go by that path to Brahmaloka from where they do not return but attain Brahman at the end of the cycle. Knowledge is the only means to Liberation. To Ramanuja and the other commentators Brahman is not attributeless but an _ essentially Personal God possessing infinite benign attributes. INTRODUCTION XV They hold that though personality as we experience it in man is limited, it need not be imvariably connected with personality as Sankara thinks, so as to eontradict infinity. They do not accept the Maya doctrine, for to them the world is real, and so they accept that the world is produced from Brahman. Madhwa, however, accepts It only as the efficient cause and not as the material cause also. The Jiva according to them is really atomic, an agent, and a part of the Lord. The knower of Brahman goes by the path of the gods to Brahmaloka where he attains Brahman and does not return to this mortal world. They do not make any distinction of higher and lower knowledge like Sankara. According to them Bhakti is the chief means to Liberation, and not Jnana. Thus to all of them Brahman, the world, and the souls are all realities. Pamanuja integrates the three into one organic whole and says that Brahman has for Its body the other two. Nimbarka integrates the three by his Bhedabhedavada, 7.e. the relation of the sentient and insentient world with Brahman is one of difference and non-difference. Madhwa, a thorough- going dualist, regards these three as quite independ- ent, eternal entities, though Brahman is the ruler of the other two. To Vallabha the world and the souls are Brahman Itself. They are real and their relation to Brahman is one of identity, as that of parts to a whole.’ For details, see the various Bhashyas on Sutras 1. 1. 2, 1. 4 23, 26, 2. 1. 26-28, 2. 3. 18-53, 8. 2. 11-30, 4. 2. 12-14, XV1 ' BRAHMA-SUTRAS SANKARA’S INTERPRETATION OF THE SUTRAS There is a strong opinion current amongst scholars to-day that whatever be the merit of Sankara’s metaphysical doctrines considered by themselves or even as doctrines elucidating the teachings of the Upanishads, he is not faithful to Badarayana in his interpretation of the Sutras. They hold that Bada- rayana was ignorant of a twofold Brahman and conse- quently of a twofold knowledge; that he was not aware of the doctrine of Maya and so did not hold that the world was unreal, but that Brahman under- went a real change into this world-order; and that the Sutras do not hold the view of absolute identity of the individual soul and Brahman. In short their view is that the system of Badarayana is a theistic system which has more affinities with the systems of Raéamanuja and Nimbarka than with Sankara’s pure Non-dualism. This view is nothing new. Bhaskara at the beginning of his commentary on the Sutras accuses Sankara of this very thing. But at the same time we can also cite Sandilya, the author of the Bhakti-Sutras, who in Sutra 30 of his work refers to Badarayana as a Monist, which shows that the view that Badarayana was an Abhedavadin was prevalent in ancient days, even as early as the Sutra period. It is not possible to deal with such a controversial subject in a short Introduction like this. All the same we shall take some salient points connected with this discussion and try to see how far such a criticism against Sankara is justified. At the outset, however, INTRODUCTION xvit it is fair to admi. that at places Sankara’s interpreta- tions secm to ke far-fetched; but this is by no means a defect of his Bhashya alone but of all the other extant Bhashyas as well. Moreover, in such a critical study we shall not gain much if we follow the letter of the Sutras, missing the general spirit of the work as a whole. It is possible to give a consistent inter- pretation of the Sutras by following the letter of the Sutras and at the same time miss the general spirit of the work as a whole. qhatvatarrae: wediseary aed Aaa | “The Sruti texts give rise to a wrong view if they are not studied as one connected whole’’—in other words the letter often kills the spirit. Sutra 2 aims at a Nirguna Brahman: To start with, let us take the definition of Brahman given by Badarayana in Sutra 2. Sutra 1 says that Brahman is to be inquired into, for the knowledge of It leads to Moksha (Liberation). The next Sutra defines Brahman and so naturally we have to understand that the Brahman the knowledge of which gives Moksha is defined here. As such we get a Saguna Brahman as the subject-matter of the Sastra and not the Nirguna Brahman of Sankara which is Existence, Knowledge, Bliss Absolute. So it appears that the author at the very beginning of the work precludes any chance of Sankara’s doctrine being read in his Sutras. But let us investigate into B xviii BRAHMA-SUTRAS the matter a little and see whether it is actually so. After the statement in Sutra 1 that Brahman is to be known, naturally the question about the nature of Brahman arises. The Sutrakara (aphorist) here Anticipates an objection that Brahman cannet be defined at all. For whatever we cognize in this world is limited and as such cannot be a characteristic of Brahman which is infinite. A limited thing cannot define an unlimited thing. Nor can any characteris- tic which is absolutely beyond our experience, like Reality etc., défine Brahman, for it is only a well- known characteristic that defines a thing and dis- tinguishes it from other things. Again the scriptures cannot define Brahman, for being absolutely unique It cannot be expressed in speech. Thus in the absence of any definition Brahman cannot be a thing worth inquiring into and cannot serve any human purpose. To refute all such objections the Sutrakara defines Brahman in Sutra 2. Granted that the world we experience cannot define Brahman as being a quality of It or as being identical with It, yet the quality of being the (supposed) cause of the world may indicate It. ‘‘Birth ete.’? mentioned in the Sutra define Brahman per accidens. “Though they inhere in the world and do not pertain to Brahman, the causality connected therewith pertains to Brahman and therefore the definition holds good. This causality indicates Brahman even as the snake indicates the rope when we say that that which is the snake is the rope, where the rope is indicated INTRODUCTION XiX by the snake owing to the illusory connection between the two. This definition, therefore, actually aims at the Nirguna Brahmar and cannot be taken as a definition of the Saguna Brahman.’ Again the Sutra refers to the Taittiriya text, ‘That. from which these beings are born... That is Brahman’’ etc. (8.1) and the wurd ‘that’ here refers to the Brahman defined as Existence, Knowledge, and Infinite in the immediately preceding section, the Ananda Valli. Therefore from this text itself we get at the real nature of Brahman. Yet it may be questioned why the author should give an indirect definition of Brahman instead of defining It in Its reai nature as, ‘Existence, Knowl- edge, Bliss is Brahman.’’ The answer is that the author has followed here the universally accepted principle of taking a student step by step from a lower to a higher truth, from a grosser to a subtler one. it is indeed by first pointing to the end of the branch of a trec that one points out the moon to the child. Similarly, first Brahman as the Cause is distinguished from this world of products, and finally by saying that from Bliss this universe is born, It is differentiated from other probable causes like atoms, the Pradhana, etc. In this way finally Brahman’s real nature as distinguished from every- thing else is described. The aspirant whose mind is turned away from the world of the senses first Bhamati and Ratnaprabha on Sankara’s comments on Sutra 9. XX BRAHMA-SUTRAS comprehends Brahman as the cause of the world. Though in Itself as the Inner Self Brahman is im- mediate, yet we have the idea that It 1s remote. Hence the Sruti first teaches that Brahman is the cause of the world, and then to remove this false notion of remoteness it teaches that It is one with the Inner Self. So long as this identity is not realized, It appears to be the cause of the world. That Bliss which admits of no difference is Brahman we learn from the Chhandogya Upanishad. ‘The Bhuman (infinite) only is Bliss. This Infinite we must desire to understand”’ (7, 23. 1). What is this Infinite which is called Bliss? The Upanishad explains: ‘‘Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite. Where one sees something else, hears some- thing else, understands something else, that is the finite. The Intinite is immortal, the finite 1s mortal’’ (Ibid. 7. 24. 1). This non-dual Bliss is the Infinite, the Brahman defined in Ananda Valli as Existence’, Knowledge, Infinite is Brahman, and from this all creation springs—so understood Bhrigu, the son of Varuna. Again the Taittiriya text, “That from which all.beings are born... Try to know that. That is Brahman,”’’ aims at defining a non-dual Brahman as the only reality and does not define a Saguna Brah- man. It defines Brahman as the efficient and also as the material cause of the universe, since It is the place of dissolution of the world. Being the material INTRODUCTION XX1 cause of everything, It is the basic reality behind everything and this gives rise to the intuition that Braiman is non-dual and that everything else is unreal. Its peing the efficient cause also establishes the fact that It is non-dual, as it precludes anything else being such an efficient causc. Thus this defini- tion, which is but one, qualifies per accidens the non- dual Brahman as both the efficient and material cause of the universe. This materiai causality of Brahman which Js non-dual, immutable Intelligence cannot be one of origination, as by primeval atoms by whose combination something new is created; nor can it be one of modification, as of the Pradhana of the Sankhyas. It is through Vivarta or apparent modi- fication through Maya or Nescience that Brahman is transformed into this universe. This universe 1s therefore illusory.’ Thut this is in accordance with Badardyana’s view is made clear by the fact that he uses the word ‘Sat’ as a characteristic epithet to denote Brahman, which he would not have done if he had considered the Jivas and the world also real like Brahman (vide Sutra 2. 3.9). The word ‘Sat’ here is interpreted by all commentators to denote Brahman. Thus we find that this definition is given by Badarayana to indicate a Nirguna (attributeless) and Nirvisesha (absolute) Brahman and not a Saguna Brahman and he has selected a significant text from ’ Siddhantalesha, Brahma Lakshanavichara. XX1i BRAHMA-SUTRAS the wide range of scriptural texts for defining his Brahman. Is Brahman the real or apparent cause of the world? Now let us take up the Sutras about the causal- ity of Brahman, viz. Sutras 1. 4. 23-27 and Sutra 2. 1. 14. Before that let us have a brief summary of the work up to 2. 1. 14. After defining Brahman in Sutra 2 the Sutrakara from 1. 1. 5 to 1. 4. 18 and in 1. 4, 23-27 shows that all the scriptural texts teach that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe, refuting the Sankhyas refute the Sankhyan objection that there are con- tradictions in the Sruti texts with respect to the First Cause. Finally Sutra 28 says that by what has been said against the Sankhyas the others also are refuted. Sutras 2. ]. 1-3 reject the authority of the Sankhya and Yoga Smritis as against the scriptures. Sutras 4-11 answer through reasoning without the aid of texts the Sankhyan objection based on reasoning that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world, for It and the world are of different nature and as such the relation of cause and effect cannot exist between them. Sutra 12 refutes the validity of reasoning in matters transcendental and thus refutes all schools which arrive at their doctrines through reasoning. Sutra 13 answers another objection of the Sankhyas that if Brahman be the material cause, then there would result non-distinction between en- INTRODUCTION XX joyer and things enjoyed, a fact established by ex- perience. The Sutra refutes it. saying that such a difference can exist in non-different things even as we have waves, foam, ete. in the sea and so the Vedantic doctrine cannot be set aside on the ground of cuntradiction to our experience. Now, duality and non-duality cannot exist in one and the same thiny, for they are mutually contradictory. The example of the sea and the waves would be apt if Brahman had aspects, but non-dual reality does not admit of such aspects. Moreover, Sutra 13 has not established the truth of the scriptural statement, ‘‘By the knowledge of the one everything else is known’? which was referred ‘to in Sutra 1. 4. 23. To establish these two things Sutras 14-20 declare that the effects ave in reality non-different from the cause, 7.e€. they have no existence apart from the cause.’ Non-difference here does not mean identity but that there is no difference.” In other words the two, Brahman and the world, have not the same grade of reality.” That is what is meant. If the world is something different from Brahman it would contradict such Sruti texts as, ‘All this was but the Self?’ (Brih. 1. 4. 1., 1. 4. 17). Again if the world is real, it would contradict texts like, ‘‘There is nothing whatsoever here’’ (Brih. 4. 4. 19). Therefore the world is non-different from Brahman. But identity "Sankara on Sutra 14.. Bhamati on Sutra 14. Siddhantalesha, Brahmakaranatvavichara. XXIV BRAHMA-SUTRAS is not what is meant by non-difference, for this is impossible between the world and Brahman, they being mutually different in nature. Hence non- difference means that it has no existence apart from Brahman, it precludes difference. The denial of identity, however, does not establish the difference of the world and Brahman, but establishes the apparent identity or the illusory nature of the world, even as the illusory snake is seen in the rope. This is what the Chhandogya text 6. 1. 4 tries to teach. Thus only by the knowledge of one thing can every- thing be known, on any other assumption 1t would be impossible to establish it. The non-difference of the world from Brahman being established, the question naturally arises that Brahman would then be responsible for creating evil for the Jiva which 1s one with It. This is answered in Sutras 2. 7. 21-238. Sutras 24-25 show how Brahman, though destitute of materials and instruments, vet is the cause of the world even as milk turns into curds without any extrancous help. The example cited raises a fresh objection in Sutra 26 that Brahman cannot at the same time be both immutable and be transformed into the world. Against this Sutra 27 says that the Sruti states both these views and so they have to be accepted, as the Sruti is the only authority with respect to Brahman. As to how these two views are to be reconciled, Sutra 28 says that even as in the individual soul diverse creation exists in the dream state without INTRODUCTION XXV marring its indivisibility, so also this world springs from Biahman. This example which is cited 1s very significant as 1t shows that Badarayana was quite familiar with Mayfivada—that he considered this world unreal in a highcr sense even as the dream world is Mayda (8. 2. 8). These two Sutras together with Sutras 2. 3. 50 and 8. 2. 18 show that he viewed the world as unreal. The subsequent Sutras establish that Prahman throrgh Maya possesses all powers necessary for creation und so on. In the above summary we find how logically and consistently Sankara has interpreted the Sutras which leaves no roora for dispute as to what Badara- yana meant in these Sutras. Thus in the whoie of Chapter I and Section 1 of Chapter IT Badarayana establishes the efficient and material causality of Brahman and in this his oppo- nents are primarily the Sankhyas who deny Its material causality. As they also quote the scriptures often in their support. they are the foremost opponents in Badardyana’s view. He disposes of others by say- ing that they too are refuted by these arguments. Sankara also, as shown above, has in Ch. I, Sec. 4+ and Ch..II, Sec. 1 consistently interpreted the Sutras as directed against the Sankhyas or as answering their objections. Some critics of Sunkara, however, think that the reasoning employed by the aphorist against the Sankhyas in Sutras 4-11 of Ch. II, Sec. 1. especially Sutra 6, weuld be hardly appropriate from Sankara’s XxXV1 BRAHMA-SUTRAS point of view, for according to him the world springs not from Brahman as Intelligence, but in so far as It is associated with Maya. Similarly Sutra 24 which says that Brahman transforms Itself into the world like milk would be inappropriate if the world were unreal; Sutra 1]. 4. 23 where Brahman is said to be the material and efficient cause of the world does not say that Brahman is the material cause through Maya; on the other hand Sutra 1. 4. 26 uses the word ‘Parinamat’ to show how Brahman is changed into the world. This criticism does not seem to be relevant. In Sutras 2. 1. 4-11 the Saénkhyas’ objection against the Vedantic doctrine of the material causality of Brah- man is answered. Here the author is concerned only with establishing Brahman as the material cause and thus refuting the dualism of the Sankhyas who posit an independent principle, the Pradhana, as the First Cause, and not with the true nature of this causality. Up to Sutra 13 he refutes the objection from the Sankhyas’ own realistic standpoint. His own view as to the true significance of the causality is established in Sutra 14. It is not true that Sankara holds that Brahman as Pure Intelligence is not the material cause, but only as endowed with Maya. Brahman or Pure Intelligence as such is the material cause of the world as Sutra 1. 4. 28 says. But because of this, we cannot expect the effect, the world, to be similar to the cause in all respects. This is made clear by Sankara in his commentary op Sutra 2.1.6 INTRODUCTION XXVii Where he says that they cannot be similar in all res- pects, for if thew were, then there would be nothing like cause and effect, nor would they be called by different names. What is essential for establishing the relation of cause and effect is that some qualities of the cause must be found in the effect also, and this is satisfied in the case of Brahman and the world. Everything in this world exists and this quality is obtained f-om Brahman which is existence; everything is also illumined by Intelligence which is Brahman. So Sutra 1. 4. 23 which says that Brahman as Intelligence is the cause is not contradicted accord- ing to Sankara’s view. This Sutra futher says, ‘This view not contradicting the proposition and illustration cited in Chh. 6. 1. 4.’’ In what sense the material causality of Brahman as Intelligence does not contra- dict this enunciation, is shown by the aphorist in 2.1.14. From these Sutras Sankara says that both Brahman and Maya are the cause of the world. Brah- man through Vivarta, and Maya through Parinama; and the qualities of both are found in the effect, the world, as we gather from our cognition of a pot, ‘The pot exists,’ ‘The pot is inert’ where as existence the pot is indentical with Brahman which is existence itself, and as inert it is identical with Maya which is inert. Everything in this world has five elements in its make-up, viz. Asti, Bhati, Priya, Nama, and Rupa, the former three have Brahman for its material cause corresponding to the three factors, Existence, Intelli- gence and Bliss, and the last two consist of Maya and XXVIll BRAHMA-SUTRAS are unreal. No doubt the aphorist takes the Pari- nama view as a workable basis in refuting the San- khyas. But we have already said that it is a well established principle of Indian teachers to take the aspirant step by step to the final truth. So Badara- yana, by taking the Parindma view-point in his earlier Sutras where Brahman is referred to as the Cause and establishing Vivarta in 2. 1. 14, has only followed this universally accepted method. That the author is not for Parinadmavada is made clear by him in Sutras 26-28. Sutra 28 clearly establishes the unreality of the world, it being illusory like the dream world. Coming to Ramanuja’s commentary we find that he is not so logical or consistent as Sankara. Accord- ing to him Brahman has for Its body the entire universe with all its sentient and insentient beings in all Its states. When the souls and matter are in the subtle state, Brahman is in the causal condition and when they are in the gross state It is in the effect state. The effect, i.e. the world, is thus seen to be non-different from the cause, i.e. the Supreme Brahman (vide Sri Bhashya Sutras 1. 4. 27 and 2. 1. 15). Badardyana does not seem to hold this view, for nowhere does he say that Brahman has for Its body the souls and matter. Even if 2. 3. 43 should mean that the souls are the body of Brahman, there is no similar Sutra to show that matter too is Its body. Moreover, if Brahman is the material cause of the world through Its insentient part only, as the above view leads to, then Sutra 1. 4. 23 which INTRODUCTION XXX says that Brahman as Imielligence is the material cause would be contradicted and Sutras 2. 1. 26-28 also would be useless, for the question of the whole of Brahman passing over into the world does not arise at all. Nor can the relation of cause and effect exist between Brahman in the causal and the effect state for it is the same Brahman in either case. Even if such a relationship be granted, it would make Sutras 2. 1. 4-6 mcaningless, for there can be no difference of nature in Brahman in the two states as between Brahman and the world—the sentient and the insentient. Ramanuja directs Sutra 14 against the Vaiseshikas, but we do not find the author making anybody else but the Sankhyus the opponents. The rest he disposes of by saying that the arguments against the Sankhyas refute others also (vide 1. 4. 28 and 2. 1. 12). The interpretation of Sutra 2. 1. 28 by Ramanuja is very far-fetched. His explana- tion that because things possess different qual- ities owing to the difference in their essential nature, Brahman which is unique can possess qualities beyond our experience, is not to the point, while Sankara’s interpretation is very happy as it gives us an idea as to how it is possible for Brahman to create the world and yet remain immutable. Moreover, Raéamaéanuja has not explained in Sutras 26-28 the con- tradiction in the Sruti texts, while Sankara’s interpre- tation reconciles the contradiction through reasoning, and such reasoning as is not against the Sruti texts is quite acceptable to all Vedantins; in fact that is what XXX BRAHMA-SUTRAS the author proposes to do in this Uttara-Mimamsa work of his. Coming to Nimbarka, his line of argument on these Sutras relating to the causality of Brahman is to establish the Bhedabheda doctrine. Sutra 2. 1. 18 he interprets first like Sankara. But in Sutra 14 the word ‘sa#qaq he interprets as ‘a 4 waufaaaa ‘not absolutely different.” That is, the effect is not absolutely differnt from the cause: it has no separate existence from Brahman. Thus from Sutra 13 which says that Brahman and the Jiva are different, Sutras 4-6 which say that the insentient world is different from It and Sutra 14 which says that they have no separate existence apart from Brahman, Nimbarka concludes that between Brahman and the sentient and insentient world there is difference as well as non-difference. But such a thing in one and the same entity is impossible. The Chhandogya text says that the clay alone is real and not the things made of clay, for they are mere names, unreal. Take for example a clay pot; when we cognize it as a pot we are not conscious of its being clay and when we cognize it as clay we miss the pot, though both these aspects are inherent in it. So we have to con- clude that its nature is illusory, for it 1s not cognized as what it is. That which is non-different from a thing and yet appears to be different and which depends upon the non-difference for its existence can- not but be illusory. So between the pot and the clay, the latter alone is real and not the pot. INTRODUCTION XXX1 Similar is the ease with Brahman and the world. Brahman alone js real and the world is unreal. ‘“When all this is but the Self, huw could one see another?”? (Brih. 2. 4. 14). Chhandogya 6. 16 calls one who sees variety as fulse-minded and the one who sees unity as true-minded. But to people who are in ignorance both difference and non-difference seem to be real, the unity being understood through the scriptures and variety through direct perception. This is only a relative or Vyavaharika state. The truth is unity. Therefore Nimbarka’s view cannot he correct. Does Badardyana accept the Pénchardtra view? In Section 2 of Chapter iI the author takes the offensive. So long he was on the _ defensive. In the whole of this section he refutes through reasoning alone, without recourse to the Sruti texts, the various schools of philosophy of the time. In this section he refutes those schools of thought that were regarded by the ortho- dox section as outside the sphere of the Vedas. We have enough references in ancient works like the Mahabharata and some of the Puranas that all these schools refuted in Section 2 by the author were so regarded. The Siva Mahimna Stotra contains the verse ‘ait aie aia: qacfraa awafafe’, which shows that Sankhya, Yoga, Pasupata and Vaishnava (which includes Pancharatra) schools of thought were XXX1i BRAHMA-SUTRAS regarded as different from ag{ or the Vedic religion with its two branches, Karmakaénda and Jnanakanda. Moreover, we find that in many works of the Pancha- ratra school the Vedas are held in contempt. Sankara himself quotes such a text. The scholiasts Govinda- nanda and Anandagiri also quote similar texts. Therefore they must have been definitely regarded by the ancients as outside the pale of the Vedas and we cannot reasonably expect Badaradyana to have accepted their view as his final conclusion in a work meant to systematize the orthodox thought of the Upanishads. Of course, to that portion which does not contradict the Vedas he has no objection; nor has Sankara, as he has made it clear in his Bhashya on Sutras 42 and 483. Ramanuja, however, sees in Sutras 44 and 45 the acceptance of the Pancharatra doctrine by a refutation of the objections raised against it in Sutras 42-43. But his interpretations are stretched. Sutra 45 he twists to mean, ‘And because the creation of the soul is contradicted by this Sastra’’, saying thereby that the question raised in Sutra 42 as to the creation of the soul does not arise at all, as this school does not hold the view. The way in which this Sutra is stretched by Rama- nuja can easily be seen by comparing it with Sutra 10 where Badardyana uses the same wording, ‘‘And on account of contradiction,’’ etc. to mean that con- tradiction in the Sankhya system makes it unaccept- able to the wise. This seems to be the Sutrakara’s view here also. Dr. Thibaut thinks, ‘It would not INTRODUCTION XXXiil be unnatural proceeding to close the polemical section with a defence of that doctrine which in spite of objections has to be viewed as the true one.’’ But that being the purpose of the whole work itself, we cannot reasonably think that the author establishes his doctrine in these two Sutras. Moreover, no other commentator sees the acceptance of the Pancharatra doctrine in this topic. Vallabha follows Sankara. Nimbarka sees the cefutation of Saktivada in the topic. He is therefore consistent in that he regards the whole of Section 2 as being devoted to a refutation of views not acceptable to the author. He accepts the Pancharatra system and so he finds some other subject in this topic, though on this account his inter- pretation is not happy. But if Vyasa had any hand in this work as already shown, then we cannot but see the refutation of the Pancharatra system in these Sutras, for we find that he does not accept this doctrine even in his Gita. The Jiva’s reai nature: Now we come to Sutras 2. 3. 16-53 which deal with the nature of the soul and its relation to Brahman. All] except Sankara interpret these Sutras to mean that the soul is atomic, an agent, and a part of the Lord. Sankara alone says that the atomicity, agency, and being a part are not the Jiva’s real nature, but its nature as a Samsdarin (transmigrating entity) and that in reality it is all-pervasive and identical with Brahman, XXXIV BRAHMA-SUTRAS The author defines Brahman as the cause etc. of this world of sentient and insentient things in Sutra 2, referring to the Taittiriya text, ‘‘That out of which all these creatures are born’’ etc. (3. 1). It is clear, therefore, that the world of sentient and insentient things has sprung from Brahman. Hence the Jivas too have sprung from the Lord. But in Sutra 17 the author says that the individual soul is not produced. Thus he contradicts his definition and also the enunciation of the scriptures that ‘‘by the knowledge of one thing everything else is known”’ (Chh. 6. 1). The Sutrakara at every place makes this enunciation the corner-stone of his argument. So we have to reconcile it and the author’s definition of Brahman with his statement in Sutra 17 which drives us to the conclusion that the Jiva as such, as a Samsarin, is an effect, but in its real nature it is eternal and identical with Brahman. That the nature of the Jiva as we experience it is unreal is made clear by him in Sutra 16. What originates is its connection with its adjuncts, gross and subtle, which is unreal. From this standpoint it is also clear why the author treats the question of the Jiva’s nature and its relation to Brahman in this section which reconciles contradic- tions in the Sruti texts with respect to creation. There are different statements about the nature of the Jiva also and these he reconciles in this section, showing thereby that in its real nature it is not created and is identical with Brahman, but as a Samsarin it is an effect, atomic, an agent, and a part of Brahman. INTRODUCTION XXXV Even as Iswara or Brahman limited by Nescience is not eternal, so is tie Jiva limited by the body, mind, etc. not eternal, but in its true nature it is eternal. Rereft of their Upadhis both are Pure Intelligence and identical. That is why the Taittiriya Upanishad after sayiny, ‘‘Existence, Knowledge, infinite is Brahman’”’ (2. 1) says, From That verily—-from this Self—is the ether born’’ ete. (2. 1), thus identifying the self as bereft of all its Upadhis with Brahman. Taittiriya 2. 1, and 8. 1 cited by the Sutrakara in his definition of Brahman all refer to the same Pure Intelligence. Thus the one ‘Existence, Knowl- edge, Infinite’ which is Pure Intelligence, reflected in Nescience is Iswara, and reflected in the Antah- karana (internal organ) is the Jiva, which is borne out by the scriptural statement, ‘“‘This Jiva has the effect for the adjunct and Iswara has the cause for the adjunct”? (Sukharahasya Up. 2. 12). This seems to be the true view-point which has guided the aphorist in fraraing the Sutras of Section 3, Chapter IT and in which sense Sankara also has interpreted them. The enunciation also is not contradicted according to this interpretation. According to Ramanuja the souls are really effects of Brahman but have existed in It from all eternity as a mode or Prakara of Brahman. So also have the elements. Yet the latter are said to originate, as at the time of creation they undergo an essential change of nature. But the souls do not undergo such a change, they are always cognizing XXXVI BRAHMA-SUTRAS agents, but at the time of creation there is an expan- sion of their intelligence and in this sense alone, i.e. in the sense that there is no essential change in their nature at creation, are the souls said to be not created (vide Sri Bhashya 2. 3. 18) while the elements which undergo change in their essential nature are said to be created. Badardyana nowhere says that the souls and Prakriti which form the body of Brahman are Its effects; nor does he anywhere declare such a difference between the souls and the elements. Again, according to Ramanuja Brahman means not pure Being but as qualified by the souls and matter for Its body. This very conception of Brahman establish that the relation between the souls and Brahman is as between a quality and the thing qualified and consequently 2. 8. 43 is redundant if the word ‘part’ there should be interpreted to convey this idea. Ramanuja sees a refutation of Advaita in Sutras 50-53. This does not seem to be intelligible at all, for the Advaitins do not say that the Jiva is all- pervading in its relative state. It is so in the state of release. Sankara makes it clear that the Jiva as such is limited and subject to injunctions and pro- hibitions, through its connection with a gross body (2. 3. 48), and that even after the gross body falls, on account of its finer Upadhis, the Antahkarana etc. which accompany it even after death (4. 2. 1-6), it still continues to be individualized (2. 8. 80), and so there is no confusion in fruits of actions done in the INTRODUCTION XXXVIi gross body (2. 3. 49 and 50). It is only when this Upadhi also, which being something created and not eternal (vide 2. 4) and therefore liabie to destruction, is rent asunder, that the Jiva attains its real nature and is all-pervading. As such, Ramapuja’s refutation of Advaita falls flat. Sankara’s interpretation of these Sutras on the other hand is happy. The Sutrakara, having established that the Jiva in its relative state is atomic and an agent but in reality all-pervading, refutes the view of those who hold that the Jivas are many and all-pervading in their relative state itself. Nimbarka and Vallabha also see the same subject in this topic which shows that Rama- nuja’s attempt to refute Advaita is far-fetched and not at all what the Sutrakara (aphorist) means. Nimbarka too regards the Jivas and Prakriti as effects of Brahman; but while matter undergoes further modification after creation, the souls do not and in this sense the soul is said to be eternal by him also. Such a view stands refuted by the same arguments as are applied against Ramanuja’s view. Coming to Sutra 43 which says the Jiva is different as well as non-different from Brahman, it has already been shown by Sankara in 2. 1. 14 that such a thing is not possible in the same entity and that non- difference alone is real. Let us now conclude this topic by considering the reasonableness or otherwise of taking Sutras 19-28 as the decisive view of the author. According to this view the soul is atomic, for the Sruti declares it XXXVUi BRAHMA-SUTRAS to be so (Mu. 8. 1. 9) and other texts mention its passing out of the body, going to heaven, etc. But then the Sruti also describes the Supreme Self as atomic in texts like, ‘Smaller than a grain of rice, smaller than a grain of barley’’ etc. (Chh. 8. 14. 8). So how can we say that the Jiva alone is atomic and not the Lord? It may be said that texts say that. Brahman is all-pervading. ‘‘All-pervading like the ether and eternal’? etc.; ‘Greater than the sky, greater than heaven”’ etc. But then the Sruti texts describe the soul also as all-pervading: ‘‘He is indeed the great unborn Self’? (Brih. 4. 4. 22); ‘‘Just as when a pot is carried, the pot alone is carried, not the ether inside it, even so is the Jiva compared to the ether,’? which expressly says it is all-pervading. Nor will it serve any purpose to say that Brahman, being the material cause of the world, must be all-pervasive, for even the atomic Jiva creates several bodies (Kayavyuha) and rules them and so Brahman though the material cause can yet be atomic. So neither by the Sruti texts nor by reasoning can the differentiation of Brahman and the Jiva as all- pervasive and atomic be justified. But according to Advaita there is no disparity in its reasoning in the two cases. Brahman due to Upadhi (adjunct) appears atomic but in reality It is all-pervasive. So also is the Jiva in its real nature all-pervading and therefore identical with Brahman, though it appears to be atomic, an agent and so on owing to its limiting adjunct, the Antahkarana. The primary texts say INTRODUCTION XXXix that Brahman and the Jiva in its real nature are all-pervading. Tne texts which speak of atomicity etc. are of a secundary import and so have to be explained otherwise.' Is Brahman with or without attributes: Now let us take up the Sutras in Chapter III, Section 2, where Badarayana describes the nature of Brahman. Sutras 11-21 according to Sankara deal with the reconciliation of texts which describe Brahman both as attributeless and as possessing attributes and mean that even from difference of place a twofold characteristic cannot be predicated of Brahman, because the scriptures teach throughout that Brahman is without attributes (11). [If it be said that such difference is taught by the scriptures we deny it, because with respect to each form the Sruti declares just the opposite of that. The Sruti explains ut every instance that the form is not true and that behind all Upadhis there is one formless principle (vide Brih. 2. 5. 1) (12). Moreover, some teach thus (vide Katha. 4. 11) (18). Verily Brahman is formless, for that is the purport of the texts (14). And as formless light takes form, so does Brahman take form in connection with Upadhis which serve the purpose of Upasana (meditation) (15). It is Pure Intelligence (16). The Sruti and Smriti teach that It is attributeless (17). Therefore we have with respect 1 Siddhantalesha, JivAnutvavich4ra. xl BRAHMA-SUTRAS to Brahman comparisons like the images of the sun. The forms are mere reflections, they are not real (18). Ramanuja and Nimbarka on the other hand see quite a different subject discussed in these Sutras. The topic is not whether Brahman is attributeless or possesses attributes, but whether It is polluted by imperfections owing to Its being inside everything as the Inner Ruler, even as the soul being embodied is subject to imperfections due to its states of waking, dream, and dreamless sleep described in Sutras 1-10. Therefore according to Ramanuja the Sutras mean that even on account of place such as matter and soul there is not the possibility of the Supreme Lord being contaminated by imperfections, since every- where in the scriptures Brahman is described as having a twofold characteristic, viz. freedom from imperfec- tions and possessing all blessed qualities (11). If it be said that since the soul also by nature possesses according to Chh. 8.7 the twofold characteristic of Brahman and yet is subject to imperfections due to its connection with a body, the Inner Ruler will likewise be subject to such conditions owing to its connection with bodies, we deny it, for the Sruti at every place denies it by saying that Brahman is immortal and therefore free from imperfections (vide Brih. 3. 7. 3—22). The imperfections in the soul are due to Karma and the Lord who is not subject to it is therefore free from such imperfections (12). Brahman can be said to have no form, as It is the originator of name and form and therefore is not INTRODUCTION xii subject tc ixarma like the souls which being e.nbodied are subject to it (14). To an objection that the differentiated form of Brahman is false, Sutra 15 answers thus: Even as on account of texts like, “Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Infinite’? we have to acccpt that intelligence constitutes the essential nature of Brahman, so also we have to admit that It possesses a twofold characteristic, as other- wise such texts become meaningless (15). And the texts say that much only, t.e. that Brahman has in- telligence for its essential nature, and does not nega- tive the other attributes of Brahman (16). The Sruti and Smriti state thus (17). For this very reason are comparisons such as reflected images of the sun. Brahman, although abiding in manifold places, ever possesses the twofold characteristic and is not con- taminated even as the sun reflected in dirty water 1s not polluted (18). Nimbarka also more or less follows Ramanuja’s interpretation as regards Sutras 11-14. Sutras 15 and 16 he interprets in a different way, and sees in them an argument for establishing the authority of the Sruti as absolute in the matter discussed in 11-14. Sutras 17-21 he interprets like Ramanuja, though he reads 21 as a separate Sutra and not as a part of 20 as Ramanuja does. A glance through these three commentaries on these Sutras convinces one of the superiority and reasonableness and also of the logical consistency of Sankara’s interpretation. Moreover, it has the merit xliy BRAHMA-SUTRAS of dealing with the solution of an important doubt. that arises in the mind of even a casual reader of the Upanishads, viz. as to the nature of Brahman— whether it is qualified or non-qualified; for the Sruti texts seem to support both views though they are contradictory. Raméanuja and Nimbarka ignore such an important subject and see a less important subject discussed in these Sutras. Secondly, they fail to bring out the force of the words of the Sutras in bold relief as Sankara does, e.g. ‘twofold characteristic’ of Sutra 11 which refers to contradictory qualities in Sankara, but not so in the other two. They therefore seem to overlook what is actually taught in the Sutras and bring in a subject-matter not meant by the aphorist. We shall be doing an injustice to Badarayana to think with Ramanuja and Nimbarka that he had omitted to discuss such an important subject in his work meant to systematize the teachings of the Upanishads. No doubt Ramanuja broaches this subject in Sutras 15 and 16 and says that both these views are to be accepted; but his interpretation of Sutra 16 is indeed stretched and cannot be accepted, while Nimbarka does not discuss the subject at all. We cannot think with Ramanuja that Badardyana disposed of such an important subject in one or two Sutras in a topic which deals with quite a different subject-matter and of less importance. RamAanuja’s introducing this subject in Sutras 15 and 16 is against the spirit of the Adhikarana (topic) even according to his own inter- pretation. It is something which he forcibly intro- INTRODUCTION xiii duces out of all relation to the context, as anybody can easily see. In fact according to their interpretation of this Adhikarana the whole of it looks redundant after what has been stated by them in 2. 1. 18. Finally the simile of the reflections of the sun is happier accord- ing to Sankara’s interpretation than according to that of the other two and the text cited by RAmanuja in Sutra 18 holds good according to Sankara’s view also and more aptly. Sutras 22-80 Sankara takes as a separate topic and interprets 22 to 24 as follows: What has been mentioned up to this (i.e. the two forms of Brahman mentioned in Brih. 2. 8. 1) is denied by the words “Not this, not this’? (Brih. 2. 8. 6) and the Sruti says something more than that afterwards. It does not deny Brahman but Its forms mentioned earlier, their transcendental reality (22). The objection that Brahman is denied because It is not experienced is not reasonable, for the Sruti says that Brahman exists, though It is not manifest on account of ignor- ance (23). And moreover It is realized in perfect meditation, so say the Sruti and Smriti (24). There- fore the Jiva becomes one with the Infinite when Knowledge dawns, for thus the scripture indicates (26). In the next two Sutras an objection is raised against Sutras 25 and 26. But on acount of both difference and non-difference being taught by the Sruti, the, relation between them is as between the serpent and its coil (27), or like that between light xliv BRAHMA-SUTRAS and its orb (28). Sutra 29 refutes this view and says: Or the relation is as given before in Sutras 25-26. And on account of the denial of everything else besides Brahman by the Sruti texts (80). Ramanuja continues the previous topic up to 26. Sutras 22-26 according to him mean: The text (Brih. 2. 3. 6) denies the previously mentioned that- muchness and says more than that. The two forms of Brahman (Brih. 2. 8. 1) do not exhaust Its attri- butes, for the text states further qualities after that. For there is nothing higher than this ‘not this’. Then comes the name, ‘the Truth of truth’; for the Pranas are true and It is the truth of them.”’ ‘Pranas’ here mean the souls, because they accompany the latter at death. The souls are true, because they do not undergo any change in their essential nature. The Lord is the Truth of these true souls, for these contract and expand with respect to intelligence, while He is unaffected. Thus the subsequent part of the text connects Brahman with some qualities. The clause ‘‘Not this, not this’’ does not deny the attributes of Brahman, but denies that Its nature is confined to these two forms only (22). The Sruti instruction is not unnecessary here, for though the world is seen, yet it is not known as a Prakara or mode of Brahman and that is what can be gathered only from the Sruti texts. So declares the Sruti (23). And Brahman’s being differentiated by these two forms is realized even as Its being of the nature of intelligence is realized by repeated meditation (25). For all these INTRODUCTION xlv reasons Brahman is regarded as Infinite. i.e. as possessing infinite attributes; for thus the attributes hold good, i.¢. the twofold characteristic of Sutra 22 (26). Sutras 27-80 are treated by Ramanuja as a separate topic. Sutras 27 and 28 give the Purva- paksha, as Sankara also says, and 29 gives the Siddhanta; but the words ‘as before’ in the Sutra refer not to Sutras 25 and 26, but to 2. 3. 43. Nimbarka follows R&amanuja in Sutras 22-24. The next two Sutras he interprets somewhat different- ly. Just as fire is manifested through the rubbing of wooden sticks, so is Brahman manifested in medita- tion (25). On realizing Brahman the soul becomes one with It (26). Sutras 27 and 28 he takes as the author’s and not as the opponent’s view. Sutra 27 describes that the relation between Brahman and the insentient world is as between the serpent and _ its coils (27) and the relation between the soul and Brahman is as between the orb and the light (28). But to an objection of the kind raised in Sutra 2.1.25: the answer is as before, t.e. 2. 1. 26 (29). Morcover, the Supreme Self is not affected by the imperfection of the soul (30). Sankara thus interprets ‘Not this, not this’? as a denial of the two forms of Brahman mentioned in Brih. 2. 8. 1. Brahman can be described only as ‘‘Not this, not this,’”’? i.e. It is not what we see. Whatever we see is not Brahman as It is. Brahman 1S something different from all this manifested world. This interpretation is in keeping with scriptural xlvi BRAHMA-SUTRAS teaching. Raémanuja and Nimbarka interpret that ‘Not this, not this’? denies only the limitation of Brahman’s nature to only these two forms, in other words It has many more attributes than these two. The two forms are real and are only two of the infinite attributes of the Lord. This seems to be a total denial of the Upanishadic teaching. ‘‘Not this, not this’? occurs in four different places in the Brih. Up. Even if Ramanuja’s explanation be allowed in Brih. 2. 8. 6—however strange and twisted it might any means yield to such an- interpretation. These texts after saying, ‘‘This Self is that which has been described as ‘Not this, not this,’ ”? says, ‘‘It is imperceptible’? etc. Other texts also describe the Self or Brahman as beyond comprehension. ‘‘There goes neither the eye, nor speech nor the mind; we know It not nor do we see how to teach about It. Different It is from all that is known, and is beyond the unknown as well’’ (Kena 1. 3-4); ‘“Whence speech returns along with the mind without realizing It’’ (Taitt. 2. 4); also Ibid 2. 9 and Katha 1. 38. 15. From these texts we find that nothing can be predicated of Brahman. From the Kena texts we find that we cannot say that Brahman is this and this in a positive way. It is not what we see and therefore It can only be described as ‘‘Not this, not this’? by denying everything we see in It. It is true that we do find the scriptures dealing with both difference and non-difference; but with what object, _ INTRODUCTION xlvii is the question. it is not to establish that both are true, for they arc mutually contradictory. A careful study of the scriptures convinces one that duality is taught in order to take the aspirant step by step through it to non-duality. Ramanuja in his Bhashya on these Sutras criticizes Sankara saying that the Sruti could not have described these two forms only to deny them later on. But that this is a process the Sruti adopts is clear from Prajapati’s instruction to Indra in the Chhandogya or Varuna’s teaching to Bhrigu in the Taittiriva Upanishad. The aspirant is gradually taken to higher and higher truths. Through duality he is led up to non-duality, the goal or final truth. Duality has not been praised anywhere in the scriptures, and no fruit is ascribed to it. On the other hand it is censured (vide Katha 2. 4. 10-11; Brih. 4. 4. 19; Mait. 4. 2. and 6. 8), which shows that the scriptures do not intend to posit duality. But non- duality is praised and immortality is said to be achieved by the knowledge of unity. According to the Purva Mimamsa principle, that which has no result of its own but is mentioned in connection with something else which has a result, is subordinate to the latter. Therefore duality which has no fruit of its own is subsidiary to non-cuality which is the main purport of the Sruti texts. Again we have texts like, “The Atman is smaller than the smallest, greater than the greatest’? (Katha 1]. 2. 20); ‘“‘Neither gross nor fine’? etc.—which negate all duality and establish the Infinity of Brahman beyond all doubts. xlvili BRAHMA-SUTRAS A question, however, may arise: If everything is negated, what will be left? We shall by such a process arrive at a nonentity. Not so. We cannot go on negating ad infinitum, but have to come finally to some basic reality, and this basic reality behind everything is the Atman or Brahman. When we remove an object, space is left behind. Similarly, when everything we see is removed or negated, Brahman is left behind, which cannot be negated and which is the witness of everything. We cannot say that by negation we come to nonentity, for the very fact that we comprehend this nonentity shows that it is being illumined by the witnessing consciousness, the basic reality even behind this idea of nonentity. In this Sutra the Sutrakara solves this doubt, showing that the negation concerns not Brahman, but only the two forms of It. To turn the drift of this discus- sion topsy turvy and establish the reality of the two forms is to ignore the spirit of scriptural teaching. Mdydavdda in the Upanishads: There is a common belief that Mayavada is not found in the scriptures and that it is Sankara’s own doctrine borrowed from the Buddhists. But such a statement is scarcely justified. In the Brihadaranyaka text under discussion we have, ‘‘Now its name: ‘The Truth of truth.’ The vital force is truth, and It is the Truth of that’? (Brih, 2. 3. 6). If the vital force, 1.€. Prajna (the soul in a state of deep sleep) of which the vital force is an Upadhi is true or real, Brahman INTRODUCTION xlix is the Truth or Reality of this real. In othcr words, Brahman’s reality is of a different grade from that of the universe. If this world is real and not Maya, as Sankara would call it, then Brahman is the Reality of this real, which shows that the world’s reality is of an inferior kind from that of Brahman and when It is realized this world is no more. A similar idea is conveyed by Chh. 7. 24. 1 where Brahman, the Infinite, is said to be immortal and the werld, the finite, is said to be mortal. But this is exactly what Sankara too says—that the two, Brahman and the world, have two grades of reality, even as the dream world and the world we experience while we are awake have two grades of reality, and as a result we are justified in saying that the dream world is Maya, as the Sutrakaraé says in 38. 2. 8, or unreal as compared with the waking state. Similarly, this world we experience 1s Maya or unreal as compared with the reality of Brahman. The dream world has a reality for the time being; so has this world so long as we are in ignorance; and Sankara nowhere denies the Vyavaharika (phenomenal) reality of this world. The scriptures explain this difference between the reality of the two, Brahman and the world, by using symbology, as for example in Chh. 6. 1. 4, whick we had occasion to explain in Sutra 2. 1. 14 where the Sruti tries to explain that the one, the clay, is more real than the many, which it identifies with name and form only., We find the same idea again in Brih. 1. 6. 8: “This immortal entity is covered by truth (the ! BRAHMA-SUTRAS five elements): The vital force is the immortal entity, and name and form are truth; (so) this vital force is covered by them.’’ Name and form, 7.e. the world we experience, are called truth, but Brahman is distinguished from them by saying that It is immortal —Its reality is of a different grade from the reality of that which is called truth. And as the reality of this world is of a lesser grade or illusory as compared with that of Brahman, It can be the cause of such an illusory world of manifoldness without undergoing any change in Itself; for an illusory manifoldness can exist in It without in any way affecting Its immutabil- ity, like a snake in a rope or the manifold dream world in the dreaming self, as the Sutrakara exempli- fies in 2. 1. 28, which brings us to the conclusion that this world is a Vivarta of the non-dual Brahman, as Sankara says. Coming to the interpretation of Sutras 27-30, Sankara connects ‘‘or as before’? in Sutra 29 with what immediately precedes in Sutras 25-26 and so it is happy. RaémAnuja connects it with Sutra 2. 3. 43 and so it is not so apt. Nimbarka’s explanation is still far-fetched; for while Ramaénuja refers for the Siddhanta only to a previous Sutra, Nimbarka refers for an objection as well as a decision to Sutras in 2.1. His interpretation of the whole topic thus appears to be much stretched. That Sankara has followed the Sutrakara faith- fully in his interpretation of Sutras 11-80 will be clearer if we just try to see the reason why the latter INTRODUCTION li treats of dream and deep sleep in this section which dezls with the nature of Brahman. Sankara at the beginning of Chapter III, Section 1, says that the transmigration of the soul is taught in order to generate a spirit of Vairdgya (dispassion). Sutras 1-10 of Section? treat of the soul’s states of dream and dreamless sleep. According to Sankara the very fact that the dream world does not fulfil the conditions of the time and space factors as in the waking state, shows that the dream world is illusory and therefore a creation of the soul and not of the Lord. From this he shows that the rea! nature of the Jiva is self-luminous and beyond all these states. Thus Sutras 1-10 elucidate the real nature of the ‘You’ in “You art That.’? Sutras 11-21 give the nature of ‘That’ and Sutras 22-80 identify the two. Thus the place of Sutras 1-10 in this section is very significant. Ramanuja and Nimbarka say that the creation of the dream world belongs to the Lord and not to the soul. If it were so, it should be as real as this world. Granting that it is the Lord’s creation, of what significance is this subject in a section that deals with the nature of Brahman? It would have been apt in 2.8 where creation is taught. If it be to create a spirit of Vairdgya, as Ramanuja says at the beginning of Chapter ITI, then it ought to have been included in Section 1 which treats of the soul’s transmigration with the same object, and thus be separated from Section 2 where it is out of place. hii BRAHMA-SUTRAS The above analysis of Sutras 8. 2. 1-80 shows that Sankara has rightly grasped the spirit of Badarayana, while Ramanuja and Nimbarka have sadly missed it. A twofold knowledge of Brahman established: Finally, let us consider Sutras 4. 2. 12-14 and Sutras 4.4.1-7. The former set of Sutras as they stand are interpreted better by Ramanuja and Nimbarka than by Sankara. According to Sankara they run as follows: If it be said (that the Pranas of a knower of Brahman do not depart), on account of the Sruti denying it (we say) not so, for the Sruti (Madhyandina recension of the text) denies the departure of the Pranas from the soul and not from the body (12). For the denial is clear in the texts of some schools (13). So in Sutra 12 the Siddhanta view is first expressed on the basis of Brih. 4. 4. 6, Kanva recension, and the objection against this is raised by the opponent in the second half of the Sutra, basing his argument on the Madhyandina recension of the text, which is answered again in Sutra 18 by Brih. 3. 2. 11, Kanva recension. By such an interpretation the significance of ‘some schools’ is lost, for it ought to have referred to some text of the Madhyandina school and not of the same Kanva school on which the Siddhanta is based in Sutra 12. Ramanuja and Nimbarka on the other hand read these Sutras as one, which runs as follows: ‘‘If it be said that the Pranas of a knower of Brahman do not depart on account of the denial by the Sruti text INTRODUCTION liti (Brih. 4. 4. 6, Kanva), we deny it; for the Sruti says that they do net depart from the soul (i.e. they accompany the soul) and.:sis is clear according to some, viz. the Madhyandina recension of Brih. 4.4. 6.’? We cannot but say that this is more happy, as the force of ‘some school’ and the word ‘hi’ (because) in the Sutra are well brought cut. Though the interpretation according to the letter of the Sutra forces us to side with Ramanuja and Nimbarka, yet if we consider the Sruti text, viz. Brih. 4. 4. 6, on which the discussion is based and also the arrangement of the Sutras in this Section 2 up to Sutra 16, we find that Sankara is more reasonable than the other two and it looks as though the Sutra- kara himself had made a slip, though he meant other- wise. Brih. 4. 4. 6 says in the first half of the text how one who is attached transmigrates, and concludes the first half by saying, ‘Thus does the man who desires transmigrate.’’ The second half speaks of the man without desires and says, ‘‘Of him who is with- out desires... and to whom al! objects of desire are but the Self—the organs do not depart. Being but Brahman, he is merged in Brahman.’’ Here it is quite clear that the Sruti contrasts the two cases of one who is attached and one who is not attached and so does not transmigrate but is merged in Brahman. Now it is well known both from the scriptures and the Vedanta-Sutras itself that a transmigrating soul at the time of death goes out with the organs, and so when in contrast to this it is said, ‘‘His organs do not liv BRAHMA-SUTRAS depart,’’ it is quite clear that the denial of departure of the Pranas is from, the body as in the case of one who is attached, ana onsequently the expression ‘from him’ in the Maédhyandina recension even ought to mean the body and not the soul. From what has been stated above we find Sankara more reasonable and consistent and therefore we can safely say that his interpretation of Sutras 12-14 as establishing a twofold knowledge is after Badara- yana’s view, though according to the wording of the Sutras it is not so happy. This sort of inter- pretation of the Sutrakaras is not without its precedent, as we find Upavarsha and Sabara doing the same in their commentaries on the Purva Mimamsa-Sutras. We now come to the last section of the work where the state of the released soul is described. Sutras 1-3 describe that on the attainment of Know- ledge the soul manifests itself in its own nature. Sutra 4 says that it attains non-distinction with Brahman. The question as to what the nature of that state is naturally arises after this and Sutras 5-7 attempt a description. The views of Jaimini and Audulomi are given and finally in Sutra 7 Badarayana says that both these views are true, for they are not contradictory. The question is, whether the views of Jaimini and Audulomi are true of the released soul in succession or simultaneously. Bada- rayana’s decision is that they are true at one and the same time according as the subject is viewed | INTRODUCTION lv from the relative or transcendental standpoint.. Sankara makes this ciear ir’ his Bhashya. His critics find fault with bim here. They say that he is obliged in this Sutra to ascribe to the truly released soul qualities whieh clearly cannot belong to it, since for such a soul no Vyavakara exists. They say thereby that his interpretation is not faithful. Such a criticism shows that they have failed to understand what Sankara means here. He does not say that the released soul is conscious of itself as possessing all the qualities described by Jaimini, but that we who are in bondage are obliged in describing the state of such a soul to nave recourse to such a description. In reality the soul when released exists as Pure Intelligence, but as Pure Intelligence is beyond our conception, we in our ignorance view it as identified with Iswara, for that is the highest reading of Pure Intelligence or the Nirguna Brahman that we can possibly conceive. Certainly there exists no Vyava- hara at all for the released soul, which is free from ignorance; but it exists for us who are in ignorance and Jaimini’s description of the state of a released soul is our description of it. Iswara’s possession of powers is not like that of an ordinary Jiva which being subject to Nescience thinks of itself as an experiencer, an agent, and so on. He is beyond all taint and therefore not subject to Nescience, and consequently does not think of Himself as possessing all these lordly powers; but these powers exist in Him, because we in our ignorance ascribe them 1vi BRAHMA-SUTRAS .to Him. Even so are these lordly powers ascribed to the released soul by us and it is regarded as identical: or having attained non-distinction with Iswara. This is the full import of Sutra 7 both according to Badarayana and Sankara. So till all souls are released, the state of the released partakes ‘of a twofold characteristic according to the view- point from which it is described—transcendental or relative, even as Brahman has a twofold characteristic of which one is illusory or read from the relative standpoint (vide 8. 2. 11-21). This attainment of Jordly powers by souls on identification with Iswara is not the same as the attainment of such powers by the knowers of the Saguna Brahman who go to Brahmaloka, for it is made clear in 4. 4. 17 that their lordly powers do not include the power of creation etc., but only power to create objects of enjJoyments at will (4. 4. 8), while this power is not negated in the case of souls which get identified with Iswara accord- ing to Sutra 4. 4. 5 and 7. That the Sutrakara makes a distinction between the attainment of Liberation by the knowledge of the Nirguna Brahman and that by the knowledge of the Saguna Brahman, is clear from Sutra 4. 1. 19, where he makes no reference to any going forth in the case of a Jivanmukta, but simply says that on the exhaus- tion of the Prarabdha Karma he attains Brahman and this is also in keeping with texts like Brih. 4. 4. 6 and especially Chh. 6. 14. 2 where it is clearly stated that his merging in Brahman is delayed just as INTRODUCTION lvii long as the body lasts. But going to Brahmaloka by “‘the path of tne gods”’ is also a kind of Liberation, for from there the soul does not return to this mortal world, but gets merged in Brahman at the end of the cycle together with Brahma, as stated in Sutra 4, 8.10. As the author is concerned in this section, with the result of Upasanas, viz. Libcration, he describes the result of the knowledge of the Nirgune Brahman in Sutras 1-7 and from 8-22 the sesult of the knowledge of the Saguna Brahman. If, as accord- ing ‘to Ramanuja and Nimbarka, there is no such distinction at all, but the description is of one kind of Liberation only, then when it is said in Sutra 4. 4. 5 that the released soul attains a nature like that of Brahman, there is no further necessity of saying that it can create at will all objects of enjoy- ment. Moreover, if being free from sin, old age etc. (Chh. 8. 1. 5) are qualities of the soul as well as of the Lord, then they will cease to be the defining characteristic of the Lord. In this case the objection raised in the first part of Sutra 1. 8. 19 will not be answered by the second half of the Sutra. The Sutra runs as follows: ‘‘If it be said that from the sub- sequent texts which refer to the Jiva ‘small Akésa’ means the Jiva, we say that the reference to the soul is in so far as its real nature is made manifest (2.e. as non-different from Brahman).’’ In the previous Sutra it was established that the ‘small Ak4sa’ in Chh. 8. 1. 1 is Brahman and not the Jiva, in spite of the reference to the Jiva in Chh. 8. 8. 4, for ‘free Iviii BRAHMA-SUTRAS from evil’ etc. which are said to be qualities of the ‘small Akasa’ are not true of the soul. At the end of his commentary on Sutra 18, Sankara says that Sutra 20 will make it clear why the individual soul is referred to in Chh. 8. 8. 4. In Sutra 19 cited above a fresh objection is raised that subsequent texts also refer to the Jiva (vide Chh. 8. 7-11 in which the waking, dream, and deep sleep state of the soul are described) and therefore ‘small Akasa’ means Jiva. The second half answers it by saying that the reference to the Jiva is in so far as its real nature is made manifest (vide Chh. 8. 12. 8). The reference to the individual soul in Chh. 8. 3. 4 is to show that in reality it is beyond the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep and non-different from Brahman. If under the circumstances ‘free from sin’ etc. are its qualities even as different from Brahman, as Ramanuja says, then ‘small Akasa’ cannot be established to be Brahman against the objection raised in Sutra 1. 8. 19. Moreover, in Sutra 1. 8. 20 (according to him 19) the explanation given by him for the reference to the Jiva in Chh. 8. 3. 4 is not at all satisfactory. He says, ‘‘This reference to the Jiva serves the purpose of giving instruction not about the Jiva, but about the nature of that which is the cause of the qualities of the individual soul, i.€. qualities specially belonging to the Lord. The reason is that such information about the released soul helps the doctrine with respect to ‘small Akasa’. The individual soul which wants to attain Brahman _ INTRODUCTION lix must also know its true nature, so that it as being endowed with auspicious qualities will finally arrive at the intuition of the Lord who is a mass of auspi- cious qualities raised io the highest excellence.”? But according to Sankara we have seen that its reference is to identify the twc—the released soul and the Lord. It is quite apparent that between the two explanations Ramanuja’s falls to the ground. Such an argument does not at all fit in as an explanation for the reference to the released soul in Chh. 8. 3. 4 and is against the spirit of the teaching of the whole of chapter 8 of the Chhandogya. Sankara’s critics find fault with him taking into consideration only Sutra 1. 3. 19; but if they only try to understand the Sutrakara taking into corsideration Sutras 18-20 and the Sruti texts to which they refer, they will find that Sankara’s interpretation is by far the best. The defects that are shown in Ramanuja’s inter- pretation of Section 4 hold good in the case of Nimbarka also. Sankara’s interpretation justified by the Gitd: Thus a comparative study of these three com- mentaries on the most important topics treated by Badarayana in his work establishes a strong case for Sankara’s interpretation of the Sutras. We find similar views also expressed in the Gita. And if, as has been shown at the beginning, the author of the Gita had a hand in the Sutras—and this fact is not questioned by Ramanuja and Nimbarka, for Ix BRAHMA-SUTRAS according to them it is the same person Veda Vyasa— then it goes all the more to show that Sankara’s interpretation is correct, for we cannot expect that the same author has expressed different views in the two works. We shall cite a few texts from the Gita which tally with Sankara’s interpretation of th Sutras. T shall describe that which has to be known, .. the beginningless Supreme Brahman. It is called neither.-being nor non-being,... Without and within all beings... Impartible, yet It exists as if divided in beings’’ (13.12-16)—these texts describe the attributelessness of Brahman. The text says that the one Immutable appears us if divided into many and not in reality. It Itself, therefore, is ‘‘the sustainer, generator, and devourer of all beings’’ (13. 16); also 7. 6 and 7. That Brahman has a two- fold nature, the Nirguna which is Its real nature and the Saguna which is the creation of Maya, is made clear by Arjuna’s question in 12. 1 and the Lord’s answer in 12. 2-5,’ where He recognizes the Nirguna aspect, but says at the same time that those devoted to the Saguna aspect are better versed in Yoga, as devotion to it is easier and therefore best suited to Arjuna and the generality of mankind, even as He says in 5. 6 for the same reason that Karma Yoga 1s better than Jnana Yoga. The individual soul in its real nature is described in 2. 11-25. Specially verses 16-18 say that it is real, all-pervading, changeless, immutable, INTRODUCTION Ixi indestructible and illimitable, while verse 24 again says it is all-pervading. Again 6. 31 establishes the identity of the self and Brahman contained in the Vedic dictum, ““fhat you art,’’ verses 29 and 80 having described the rea] nature of ‘you’ and ‘That’; while 18. 29-84 describe the real nature of the soul as identical with Brahman. But the soul in its state of bondage being deluded considers itself an agent and experiencer, atomic and a part of the Lord. ‘The Gunas of Prakriti perform all action. With the understanding deluded by egoism, man thinks, ‘I am the doer’ ”’ (3. 27). See also 14. 28 The doctrine of Maya is clearly referred to in the following texts: ‘‘Knowledge is enveloped in ignorance, hence do beings get deluded’? (5. 15); ‘This world knows Me not, being deluded by the modifications of the Gunas. Verily this divine Maya of Mine is difficult to cross over... deprived of dis- crimination by Maya they follow the Asuric ways’’ (7. 18-16); ‘I am not manifest to all, being veiled by My Yogamaya”’ (7. 25); ‘‘The Lord dwells in the heart of all beings causing them to revolve by His Maya’’ (18. 61). Finally, though stress is laid on Bhakti in the Gita, nowhere does it say that Bhakti is superior to Knowledge. On the other hand we find Knowledge highly praised. ‘‘The fire of Knowledge burns all Karma to ashes. There exists nothing so purifying like Knowledge’? (4. 87-38); Lxii BRAHMA-SUTRAS ‘‘Supremely dear is the wise man to Me. I regard him as My very Self’ (7. 17-18). Conclusion: In conclusion, we would like to state that from what all has been said above we do not mean to suggest that Sankara’s interpretation of the Sutras is the only true one. Rather our object has been to show that Sankara too, like the other great com- mentators, is justified in interpreting the Sutras in the way he has done. The fact is, Badardyana has systematized the philosophy of the Upanishads in his work, and like them his Sutras also are all-com- prehensive. The Upanishads, we must remember, do not teach throughout any particular doctrine. They contain various doctrines which are meant for people at different stages of spiritual evolution. They are not contradictory, but rather they are based on the principle of Adhikaribheda, as all are not capable of apprehending the same truth. The old idea of Arundhati-darasana-nyaya’ applies. Nearly every chapter in the Upanishad begins with dualistic teach- ing or Upasanad and ends with a grand flourish of Advaita. God is first taught as a Being who is the creator of this universe, its preserver, and the de- struction to which everything goes at last. He is the one to be worshipped, the Ruler, and appears to be outside of nature. Next we find the same teacher ' The method of spotting the tiny star Arundhati with the help of bigger stars near it, calling them Arundhati. INTRODUCTION Ixil teaching that God is not outside of nature, but imma- nent in nature And at last both ideas are discarded and it is taught that whatever is real is He; there 1s no difference. ‘‘Svetaketu, you art That.’? The immanent one is at last declared to be the same that is in the human soul.! Tunis fact is recognized by Badarayana too and so commentators make a mistake when they think that the Sutras propound only their doctrine and nothing else. This grand principle uf Adhikaribheda is the foundation on which the teachings of the Upanishads, the Brahma-Sutras, and the Gita are based and that is the reason why they have been universally accepted by the Hindus of all classes and denominations. From this point of view we are inclined to think that of all the commentators Sankara has done the greatest justice to the Sutrakaéra by his twofold doctrine of the absolute and phenomenal reality. 1 Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. III. ADHYAS4 OR SUPERIMPOSITION The whole of Sankara’s philosophy may be summed up as follows: aw ea Hafner Nal Aa TIT | — The Brahman of the Uparishads 1s the only Reality, and everything else--this world of manifoldness—is unreal, is a mere appearance; the individual soul (Jiva) is identical with Brahman, the One without a second, which the scriptures define as Existence- Knowledge-Bliss Absolute. ‘‘Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity’? (Taitt. 2.1); ‘Brahman is Knowledge, Bliss’? (Brih. 8.9.28). This identity of the Jiva and Brahman is clearly stated by the scrip- tures in texts like: ‘You art That, O Svetaketu’”’ (Chh. 6.8.7), ‘I am Brahman”? (Brih. 1-4-10), and ““The Self alone is to be meditated upon” (Brih. The question then naturally arises: If Truth is one, whence arises this many which we experience through the senses? Truth cannot contradict experience. So Sankara had to explain this apparent contradiction between Truth and our. everyday experience. He says that this plurality is an illusion (Maya). It has no reality, for it disappears whea the knowledge of the true nature of Brahman is realized. It is just like seeing a snake in a rope in the dark. This wrong perception is brought about by ignorance (Avidya), which is beginningless. It is this ignorance which is the cause of all this duality, Brahman being mistaken for the world. On account of this ignorance the individual soul identifies itself with its adjuncts (Upadhis) viz. the body, senses, etc., which are only superimposed on it. This identification makes the soul think that it is the doer, enjoyer, etc.—though the truth is that it is none of these—and thereby it comes under the sway of birth, death, happiness, misery, etc., in short, becomes bound down to this world (Samsara). When Sankara says that the world is false, he does not mean that it is absolutely nothing, but that our experience is liable to be stultified by means of knowledge of things as they are. The world has a relative existence; it is true for the time being, but disappears when true knowledge dawns. It is not real for all times, in other words, it is not real from the absolute standpoint. Maya or ignorance is not a real entity. We can neither say that it exists nor that it does not exist. It is a mystery which is beyond our understanding; it is unspeakable (Anir- vachaniya). As Mayé is not real, it cannot be related to Brahman, the Reality, in any way whatsoever; for any relation between truth and falsehood is impossible. The relation is only apparent, and there- fore Brahman is in no way affected by this illusion which is superimposed upon It, even as the rope is. not affected by the snake that is assumed to exist in it. Therefore the only way to liberation from this worldly existence (Samsara) is to get rid of this: Adhyasa] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 5 wrong notion trough the real knowledge of Brahman. Just as in the case of the rope and the snake, it is the knowledge of ihe rope alone that removes the illusion of the snake and nothing else, so also it is the knowledge of Brahman alone that brings about the cessation of this relative existence (Samsara). A man who knows It alone truly, passes beyond death; there is nu o'her path to go by’”’ (Svet. 3.8); He comes not to death who sees that One.’’ Pilcrimages, austerities, worship and charity—these by themselves, without Knowledge, cannot help us to attain Liberation. Their utility lies only in purifying our mind (Chittastiddhi), cleansing it of all worldliness, and thus making it fit to comprehend the Truth. When Brahman is realized this phenom- enal world disappears automatically, without any further effort on the part of the individual. Knowledge of Brahman being thus the only way to Liberation, an inquiry into Brahman through the study of the Brahma-Sutras is absolutely necessary. Sankara’s explanation of the world as an illusion has given his philosophy the name of Mayavada or Anirvachaniya Khyativada. It is also known as Vivartavada, the doctrine of the apparent modifica- tion of Brahman into this phenomenal world, as opposed to Parindmavada or the doctrine of the actual modification of Brahman into this phenomenal world, as held by some other schools of Vedanta like the Visislhtadvaitavada of Ramanuja. Sankara anticipated that this method of explain- ing the phenomenal world would raise a protest from the various other schools of his time. So at the beginning of his commentary on the Brahma-Sutras, he writes a masterly introduction, which is well known as the Adhyasa Bhashya or the section dealing with superimposition, wherein he establishes super- imposition as a statement of fact and not a mere hypothesis. He starts with the objections that can possibly be raised against his theory of super- imposition and then refutes them. He says: It is well known that the subject and the object, which have for their spheres or contents the notions of ‘I’? and ‘You’ respectively, and which are opposed to each other as darkness and light, cannot be identified. Hence their attributes also cannot be identified. Consequently the superimposition of the object and its attributes on the subject, whose essence is pure intelligence, and vice versa, ought to be a logical impossibility. If the world phenomena are a case: of super- imposition, like the snake in the rope, then which is superimposed on which? Is the world super- imposed on Brahman, or is it the reverse? In the latter case, the world, which is the substratum, like the rope in the example, would be a reality. If it is the other way—the world on Brahman—it is not possible, for Brahman is not an object which can be perceived by the senses like the rope. A _ thing becomes an object when it is limited by time, space, and causation. Since Brahman is unlimited, It is Adhyasa] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 7 beyoud these, and so cannot be an object of per- ception; as such It cannot be the substratum of a. superimposition. Brahman is also the inner Self of everyone and therefore can never be separate and in front of a person like a rope, when alone the world can be surimposed on It. Neither can Brahman be both subject and object of the thinking process, for one and the same being cannot both be the agent and the object of its activity at the same time. An object is that on which is concentrated the activity of the agent, and hence it must be different from the agent. If, again, Brahman is manifested by some other knowledge and thus becomes an object, It ceases to be self-luminous and becomes limited, and this the scriptures do not accept. Further, in all cases of superimposition there is an antecedent real knowledge of the object which is superimposed, as of the snake in the example. So to superimpose the world on Brahman a real knowl- edge of the world is necessary, and this would make the world a reality, with the result that the cessation of the world phenomena would be an impossibility and Liberation would be impossible. Thus in what- ever way we may try to establish the theory of superimposition, we are not able to do so. Yet, says Sankara, it is natural (a self-evident fact) on the part of man, because of ignorance, not to distinguish between the two entities (the subject and the vbject), which are quite contradictory, and to superimpose the one on the other, and their attributes as well, and thus mixing up the real and the unreal to use such phrases as ““That is 1’’, or This is mine’’. The Self again is not altogether a non-object, for it is the object of the notion of the Ego. The Self does not entirely elude our grasp. Though the inner Self is not an object and is also without parts, yet owing to ignorance, which is unspeakable and without a beginning, attributes like mind, body, senses, etc., which are products of ignorance, are superimposed on the Self, and _ it behaves as if it were an agent, enjoyer, possessed of parts, and many—although in truth it is none of these—and thus becomes an object. The real Self can never be an _ object of knowledge. Self- consciousness is possible only with respect to a Self already qualified by these adjuncts (Upadhis). This sounds like an argument in a circle; for to establish superimposition we have to accept the Self to be an object, and the Self can be an object only through the superimposition of adjuncts (Upadhis); it is actually not so. It is a case like the seed and the tree. The seed gives rise to the tree, which again produces the seed, the cause of the future tree, and so on. So in this series of illusions without a beginning, the Self, which is the substratum of the present superimposition, is an object on account of a past superimposition, and that one had for its substratum the Self, which had become an object of a still earlier superimposition, and so on ad infinitum. The pure Self without the limiting Adhyasa] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 9 adjuncts is xucver the substratum of a_ super- imposition. It is the difference in the _ limiting adjuncts, as shown above, that makes it possible for the Self to be at the same time an agent and the object of action. Superimposition, again, is due to ignorance and hence it is not necessary that the knowledge of the object superimposed must be a real knowledge. It is enough if we have a knowledge; it need not necessarily be real; it can itself be another illusory knowledge. That the Self exists is proved by the intuitive knowledge we have of it. This is well known and but for it nothing would have been cognized in this world. ‘‘He shining, everything else shines’? (Kath. 2.2.15). We know things in and through it; no consciousness or experience is possible independently of it. Everyone is conscious of his own Self. for no one thinks, “I am not’’. Nor, again, is 1t necessary that the object to be a substratum of a superimposition should be before us, for we see that Akasa (sky), which is not visible to the senses, becomes a substratum for superimpositions by the ignorant, who impute blueness, spherical shape, etc., to it in such expressions as, ‘“The sky is blue’’, and “It is spherical’. Thus superimposition is an established fact. But then direct perception, which is the best of all proofs—since it is the basis of all other means of knowledge like inference etc.—affirms this world of manifoldness. How can the scriptures that deny it carry conviction as against direct experience? They cannot. Hence scriptural texts that deny the many and uphold unity will have to be interpreted in a manner so as not to contradict our experience. This view cannot stand. For the scriptures (Srutis) are impersonal, eternal, self-luminous, and so on. Their validity is direct and self-evident and _ therefore infallible. They constitute by themselves an inde- ‘pendent source of knowledge. Hence they too are to be accepted as authoritative. The fact is that each evidence of knowledge has its own sphere wherein it is absolutely authoritative. Perception has its supreme validity in knowledge through the senses. There a hundred texts cannot prevail against it. The scriptures (Srutis) on the other hand have their absolute authority in a province where per- ception cannot be of any avail. Their province is transcendental knowledge, which cannot be attained in any other way. Here revelation, which does not depend on other sources of knowledge, is the final authority, and not perception or even reason. The scriptures do not deny the empirical validity of perception; they deny only its absolute or transcen- dental validity. SUPERIMPOSITION DEFINED Superimposition, says Sankara, is the apparent presentation to consciousness, by way of remem- brance, of something previously observed in some other thing. It is an apparent presentation, that is Adhyasa] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 11 knowledge which is subsequently falsified; in other words, it is illusory knowledge. According to Vachaspati Misra this is the fundamental character- istic of superimposition, and the rest of the definition only differentiates it from those given by other schools of philosophy. ut the author of the com- mentary Ratnaprabhd takes apparent presentation in some other thing as the characteristic mark of super- imposition, and this scems to be more in keeping with Sankara, who says in his commentary: ‘But all these definitions ayree in so far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing.”’ As it is impossible to have illusory knowledge without the mixing up of two things, we find the words something previvusly observed in the definition. These words, together with the words apparent pre- sentation, make it clear that the thing superimposed is not the real object seen some time before, but something like it. A mere experience, and not the reality, is what is necessary; hence the word observed. The experience should not be a present one, but a past one, and that is the significance of the word previously. So the thing superimposed is a false or unreal thing. But the thing on which it is superimposed is a real thing. The words by way of remembrance excludes all cases of recognition where the object previously observed again presents itself to’ our senses, as when a person seen at a particular place is again seen at another place. In 12 | BRAHMA-SUTRAS [Adhyasa remembrance the object previously observed is not in renewed contact with the senses. It is mere remembrance that operates in the case of super- Imposition. This definition of superimposition meets an objection of the Mimamsakas, who say that an unreal thing cannot be an object of experience. According to them all knowledge is real; there can be nothing ‘like false knowledge. They uphold the intrinsic validity of all knowledge, for every knowledge produces a sense of certainty in us and we have no doubt about it at the time. If it were otherwise, then we should always be in doubt and never arrive at any certainty. So every knowledge is true for the time being, though subsequent experience may prove that it was wrong, as in the case of an illusion. But from the definition of superimposition given by Sankara we find that because a particular thing is experienced it does not for that very reason become real. A thing may’be unreal and at the same time may be experienced. Otherwise the water in a mirage would be a reality, which in fact we know it is not. The Prabhakara school of Mimamsakas raise a fresh objection. How can the world be unreal or non-existent? Non-existence is not a category by itself; it can be conceived only in relation to a real object. We speak of non-existence when one real object is predicated in terms of another real object. When we think of a pot in terms of a cloth, we say Adhyasa] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 18 the nez,ation. »f the cloth is the pot. That is all that ix meant by non-existence; apart from this, it has no reality. An unreal object can never be the object of our experience. So this world, if it were unreal, could never be the object of our experience.; Applying this argument in the case of a mirage, we find that the rvality, the sun’s rays refracted by layers of air, is, according to the Mimamsakas, nothing but the negation of water, and it is therefore self-evident thut the phenomenon we _ exnverience cannot be water. Neither can they say that the water in the mirage:s not real, since it is experienced. So the water in the mirage is neither real nor unreal, nor can it be both at the same time. Therefore we have to accept the phenomenon as something beyond our comprehension (Anirvachaniya), which is exactly the view of Sankara. Sankara says that the nature of objects is two- fold, real and unreal. The first manifests by its very nature, depending on the object itself; the second, the unreal appearance, depends on some other thing for its manifestation. In a mirage the rays of the sun are a reality, but their appearance as water is unreal and depends on something else, the impressions (Samskaras) produced by seeimg water elsewhere before. That which is real always continues to be so, but the unreal is ever changing. Brahman, the Reality, remains unchanged; but Maya and its nroducts, which are assumed to exist in Brahman, are unreal and therefore everchanging, yet experienced by us. The world phenomena are neither real nor unreal, nor both; they are unspeakable (Anirvachaniya). _ DEFINITION OF SUPERIMPOSITION ACCORDING TO OTHER SCHOOLS The four schools of philosophy in Buddhism define superimposition as ‘‘the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another’. They main- tain that in superimposition forms of cognition, or modes of the internal organ in the form of the object, are superimposed on an external object which itself may be real or illusory. The Prabhakaras refute this definition, for according to the Buddhists there is no separate entity called the Self apart from consciousness (Vijnina). The Self is but a form of consciousness. If in an illusion, where a rope 1s taken for a snake, the snake also be a form of cognition, then our experience ought to be of the kind, ‘I am a snake’’ or “‘My snake’’, and not as ‘‘This is a snake’’. Therefore Prabhakaras define superimposition as ‘an error arising from the non- perception of the difference of that which is super- imposed from that on which it is superimposed’’. There is no positive wrong or illusory knowledge, but a mere non-perception of the difference between two real experiences, one of which is a_ past experience. Where a mother-of-pearl is taken for silver, the difference between the mother-of-pearl seen at the moment and the silver remembered is not Adhyasa] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 15 perceived. Naiy4yikas refute this definition on the ground that mere non-perception of the difference cannot induce us to action. But as a matter of fact we are tempted to possess the silver seen in a mother- of-pearl. Where there is no positive knowledge, as, for example, in profound sleep (Sushupti), there is no activity. It is positive knowledge that is responsible for our activity, as we find from our experience in the dream and waking states. Nor can a mere remembrance induce us to action. So in iliusion we are conscious of silver as a reality present before us, and not as a mere remembrance. The Naiyayikas therefore define superimposition as “the fictitious assumption of attributes (like those of silver) contrary to the nature of the thing (e.g. the mother-of-pearl) on which something else (silver) is superimposed’’. An identity is established be- tween the object present before us (the mother-of- pearl) and the silver remembered, which is not here and now, but imagined, and which eaists as a reality somewhere else. The person is not conscious that it is only.a memory of silver, and not an actuality. This identity between the silver seen elsewhere and the mother-of-pearl is what gives rise to the illusion. There is thus a positive factor in this experience, which is not the case in the Prabhakaras’ definition. Yet it may be questioned how the silver which exists elsewhere can be in contact with the senses, which is essential if the silver is to be experienced as an actuality in front of us and not a mere memory. If it be said that there is transcendental contact (Alaukika Jnanalakshana Sannikarsha) of the senses with it, then where fire is inferred from smoke we can say it is also a case of transcendental contact, and inference as a means to knowledge becomes unnecessary. Therefore we have to accept that in illusion an indescribable (Anirvachaniya) silver is produced, which is a reality for the time being. It is this silver which is directly perceived by the senses and gives rise to the knowledge, ‘‘This is silver’’. The silver that is seen in the mother-of-pearl is not present somewhere else, for in that case it could not have been experienced as here and now; nor is it in the mind. Neither is it a mere nonentity, for then it could not have been an object of percep- tion; nor can it be inherent in the mother-of-pearl, for in that case it could not have been sublated afterwards. So we are forced to say that the silver has no real existence anywhere, but has only an apparent reality for the time being which is unspeakable. This superimposition is called ignorance (Avidya), metaphorically, the effect being put for the cause. Ignorance does not mean want of knowledge, but that kind of knowledge which is stultified later on by the knowledge of things as they are. Its counter- part is called knowledge (Vidya). When the Self is discriminated from its limiting adjuncts through vedantic discipline and practice (Sadhana), viz. hearing of scriptural texts, reflection, and meditation Adhyasa] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 17 on them, then knowledge dawns, which destroys this superimposition. A mere intellectual knowledge is however not meant here, but uctual realization. Since through this superimposition the two objects are not in the least affected by the good or bad qualities of each other, once true knowledge dawns, it roots out ignorance with all its effects, leaving no chance of, its cropping up again. The recrudescence would have been pussible if owing to the super- imposition the Self was in any way contaminated by the non-Self and its properties. This superimposition (Adhyasa) due to ignor- ance is the presumption on which are based the distinctions among the mean: of knowledge, objects of knowledge, and knowing persons, in our career of daily activity, and so are also based all scriptural texts, whether they refer to rituals (Karma) or know- ledge (Jnana). All our experience starts in this error which identifies the Self with the body, senses, etc. All cognitive acts presuppose this kind of false identification, for without it the pure Self can never be a knower, aud without a knowing personality, the means of right knowledge cannot operate. There- fore the means of right knowledge and the scriptural texts belong to the sphere of ignorance (Avidy4). They are meant only for one who is still under ignor- ance and has not realized the Self. They are valid! only so long as the ultimate Truth is not realized;: they have just a relative value. But from the stand- po of the ultimate Truth, our so-called. knowledge is all Avidya or no knowledge at all. In the pheno- menal world, however, they are quite valid and are capable of producing empirical knowledge. That our knowledge (empirical) is no knowledge at all is furtiier proved by the fact that we do not differ from animals in the matter of cognition. Just as a cow runs away when she sees a man with a raised stick in his hand, while she approaches one with a handful of green grass, so also do men, who possess higher intelligence, walk away from wicked persons shouting with drawn swords, while they approach those of an opposite nature. The behaviour of animals in cognition etc., is well known to be based on ignorance. Therefore it can be inferred that man’s conduct in the matter of cognition etc., s0 long as they are under delusion, is also similarly based. It may seem rather strange to say that even the scriptures belong to the field of ignorance (Avidya); for though in ordinary matters of cognition etc. we may resemble animals and act through ignorance, yet in matters religious, such as the per- formance of sacrifices, the person who engages himself in them has the knowledge that the self is separate from the body, since otherwise he cannot expect to enjoy the fruits of his ritualistic acts in heaven, the body being destroyed at death. But we forget that though a person who engages himself in ritualistic acts may have a knowledge of the Self as distinct {from the body, yet it is not necessary that he should Adhyisa] BRAUMA-SUTRAS 19 have a knowledge of the reai nature of the Self as given by the Vedanta texts; rather such knowledge is destructive to him. For how can a person who kuows the Self to be not an enjoyer, agent, and so forth undertake any sacrifice enjoined by the scriptures? Seriptural texts like. ‘“‘A Brahmana should perform a sacrifice,’ are operative only on the supposition that attributes such as caste, stage of life, age, and circu.nstances are superimposed on the Scif, which ‘s none of these. Not only is rituailism (Karmakanda) meant for persons under ignorance (Avidya), but even su is the Vedanta; for without the distinction of the means of knowledge, objects of knowledge, and knower it is not possible to comprehend the meaning of the Vedanta texts. A person who is conscious of these distinctions is under the sway of ignorance (Avidya), being in the world of duality. But there is a difference between Vedanta and ritualism. While the latter has for its goal that which is within the sphere of ignorance, like enjoyment in heaven etc., the former helps one to realize his true nature, which destroys all ignorance. How can ignorance lead to knowledge? Empiric- al knowledge can produce transcendental knowledge through its empirical validity. To put it in Sri Ramakrishna’s beautiful language, ‘‘When we run a thorn in our hand we take it out by means of another thorn and throw out both. So relative knowledge ‘alone can remove that relative ignor- ance which blinds the eye of the Self. But such 20. BRAHMA-SUTRAS [Adhyasa knowledge and such ignorance are both alike included in Avidya; hence the man who attains to the highest Knowledge (Jnana), the knowledge of the Absolute, does away in the end with both knowledge and ignorance, being free himself from all duality.’’ But before the dawning of real knowledge the authority of the Vedas stands unquestioned, for a knowledge that has not been realized cannot prevent a person from entering on ritualistic activities. It is only after realization that scriptural texts cease to be operative. But before that, ‘Let the scriptures be your authority in ascertaining what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. Having known what is said in the ordinance of the scriptures you should act here’? (Gita 16.24). But when realization dawns, then, ‘To the sage who has known the Self, all the Vedas are of so much use as a reservoir is when there is flood everywhere”’ (Gita 2. 46). It is only for the knower of Brahman that they have no value, and not for others. CHAPTER I --------- [Section I] its pre-requisites. TATA AAAAT Ne I wa Now Wa: therefore s@iasia the inquiry (into the real nature) of Brahman. 1. Now (after the attainment of the requisite spiritual qualities) therefore (as the results obtained by sacrifices etc., are ephemeral, whereas the result of the knowledge of Brahman is eternal), the inquiry (into the real nature) of Brahman (which is beset with doubts owing to the conflicting views of various schools of philosophy, should be taken up). At the very beginning the utility of such an inquiry is questioned. Objection: Such an inquiry is not worth the trouble. An intelligent man generally does not ente? into an inquiry about an object which is already known, or the knowledge of which does not serve any useful purpose. He is always guided by utility. Now Brahman is such an object. As Brahman pure and unconditioned, there is no doubt or indefiniteness about It, for we have such definitions as, ‘Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, Infinity’? (Taitt. 2.1). As identical with the Self (Atman)—which ‘the Vedanta holds—also, there is no doubt about Brahman; for the Self is nothing but the object of the notion of ‘I’, the empirical self which is well known to exist as something different from the body, senses, etc. Moreover, no one doubts his own existence. There is therefore no indefiniteness about Brahman, which would induce one to make an inquiry into It. The objection that this empirical self is a result of super- imposition (Adhydsa) of the non-Self on the Self and vice versa, and is therefore not the true Self, cannot be accepted, for such a _ superimposition between two absolutely contradictory objects is not possible. | Again, the knowledge of this Self or Brahman which, as shown above, everyone possesses, cannot destroy the world phenomena and helfbne to attain Liberation, for they have been existing together side by side all along from time immemorial. And as there is no other knowledge of the Self besides ‘Ego- consciousness’, which can be called the true knowledge of the Self, there is no chance of the world phenom- ena ever ceasing to exist. In other words, the world is a reality, and not something illusory. So the knowledge of Brahman serves no useful purpose such as the attainment of Liberation from relative existence (Samsara). For these reasons an inquiry into Brahman is not desirable. | 11.1] __ BRABMA-SUTRAS 2 _ Aaswer: An inquiry into Brahman ‘s desir- able, because there is some indefiniteness with respect to It, for we find various conflicting views concerning {ts nature. Different schools of philosophy hold different views. Superimposition would have been an impossibility, and there would have been no indefinitcness about’ Brahman, if the empirical self had been the rea} Self. But it 1s not. The scrip- tures (Srutis) say that the Self is free from all limiting adjuncts and is infinite, all-blissful, all- knowing, One without a second, and so on. This the scriptures repeatedly inculcate, and as such it cannot be intcrpreted in any secondary or figurative sense. But the empiricai self is felt as occupying definite space, as when we say, ‘I am in the room’, as involved in manifold miseries, as ignorant, ete. How can this kind of notion be regarded as the true knowledge of the Self? To regard the Self, which is beyond limitation etc., as being limited etc., is itself an illusion, and hence superimposition is a self- evident fact. The result of the true knowledge of the Self leads to Liberation and so serves a very, very fruitful purpose. Therefore an inquiry about Brahman through an examination of the Vedanta texts dealing with It is worth while and should be undertaken. | The word now in the Sutra is not used to introduce a new subject that is going to be taken up, in which sense it is generally used in other places, as for example, in the beginning of the Yoga-Sutras or the Purva Mimamsé-Sutras. Neither is it used in any other sense, except that of immediate conse- cution, that is, it implies an antecedent, which existing, the inquiry about Brahman would be possible, and without which it would be impossible. This antecedent is neither the study of the Vedas, for it is a common requisite for Purva Mimamsa as well as Vedanta, nor the knowledge and per- formance of rituals prescribed by the Karmakanda, for these in no way help one who aspires after knowledge, but certain spiritual requisites. The spiritual requisites referred to are: (1) discrimina- tion between things permanent and _ transient, (2) renunciation of the enjoyment of fruits of action in this world and in the next, (8) the six treasures, as they are called, viz., not allowing the mind to externalize and checking the external instruments of the sense organs (Sama and Dama), not thinking of things of the senses (Uparati), ideal forbearance (Titiksha), constant practice to fix the mind in God (Samadhana), and faith (Sraddha); and (4) the intense desire to be free (Mumukshutvam). AHATAEY TW: ll il satfz Origin etc. (i.e. sustenance and dissolution) wa of this (world) aa: from which. 2. (Brahman is that omniscient, omnipotent cause) from which proceed the 1.1.2] BRAHMA-SUTRAS | 25 origin etc. (.e. sustenance and dissolu- tion) of this (world). In the previous Sutra it has been established that an inquiry into Brahman should be made as it heips Liberation. Knowledge of Brahman leads to Liberation. Now in order that we may attain this knowledge of Brahman, It must have some characteristics by which It can be known; otherwise it is not possible to have such knowledge. The opponent holds that Brahman has no such character- istics by which It can be defined, and in the absence of a definition there can be no knowiedge of Brahman, and consequertly no Freedom. This Sutra refutes thet objection and gives a definition of Brahman: ‘‘That which is the cause of the world is Brahman’’—where the imagined ‘“Ceause of the world’? is indicative of Brahman. This is called the Tatastha Lakshana, or that characteristic of a thing which is distinct from its nature and yet serves to make it known. In the definition given by this Sutra, the origin, sustenance, and dissolution are characteristics of the world and as such are in no way related to Brahman, which is eternal and changeless; yet these indicate Brahman, which is imagined to be the cause of the world, just as an imagined snake indicates the rope when we say, ‘‘that which is the snake is the rope’’. The scriptures give another definition of Brahman which describes Its true nature: ‘Truth, 260 | BRAHMA-SUTRAS Knowledge, Infinity is Brahman.” This is called the Svarupa Lakshana, that which defines Brahman in Its true essence. These words, though they have different meanings in ordinary parlance, yet refer to the one indivisible Brahman, even as the words, father, son, brother, husband, etc., refer to one and the same person according to his relation with different individuals. It must not however be thought that the First Cause of the universe is arrived at by this Sutra through mere reasoning, inference, and other means of right knowledge usually valid in this sense world. Brahman cannot be so established independently of the scriptures (Sruti). Though from the effect, the world, we can infer that it must have a cause, we eannot establish with certainty what exactly is the nature of that cause. We cannot say that Brahman alone is the cause and nothing else, as Brahman is not an object of the senses. The relation of cause and effect can be established where both the objects are perceived. Inference etc. may give only strong suggestions of Brahman’s being the First Cause of the world. A thing established by mere inference, however well thought out, is explained otherwise by greater intellects. Reasoning also is endless accord- ing to the intellectual capacity of people and there- fore cannot go far in the ascertainment of Truth. So the scriptures ought to be the basis of all reasoning. It is experience that carries weight, and the scriptures are authoritative because they are the records of 1.1.2] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 27 the experience of master minds that have come face to face with Reality (Aptavakya). That is why the scriptures ar? infallible. Hence in ascertaining the First Cause the scriptures alone are authority. The prime object of this Sutra, therefore, is not to establish Brahman through inference but to discuss scriptural passages which declare’ that Brahman is the First Cause—texts like> ‘That from which these beings sare born, by which they live after birth and into which they enter at death— try to know That. That is Brahman’ (Taitt. 3.1). The Sutra collects the Vedanta texts for the full com- prehension ot Brahman. Once the scriptures have declared Brahman to be the First Cause, reasoning ete. may be taken advantage of in so far as they de not contradict the scriptures, but rather supple- ment them, in ascertaining the sense of the Vedanta texts. Such reasoning must be corroborative of the truth inculeated. This kind of reasoning includes the hearing of the texts (Sravana), thinking about their meaning (Manana), and meditation on them (Nididhydsana). This leads to intuition. By intuition is meant that mental modification (Vritti) of the mind (Chitta) which destroys our ignorance about Brahman. When the ignorance is destroved by this mental modification in the form of Brahman (Brahmakara Vritti), Brahman, which is_ self- luminous, reveals Itself. In ordinary perception when we cognize an object the mind (Chitta) takes the form of the external object, which destroys the ignorance about it, and consciousness reflected in this modification of the mind manifests the object. In the case of Brahman, however, the mental modifica- tion destroys the ignorance, but Brahman, which is consciousness pure and simple, manifests Itself, being self-luminous. That is why the scriptures describe Brahman as ‘Not this’, ‘Not this’, thus removing the ignorance about it. Nowhcre is Brahman des- cribed positively, as ‘It is this’, ‘It is this’. There is thus a difference between an inquiry into Brahman and an inquiry into religious duty (Dharma Jijnasa). In the latter case, the scriptures alone are authority. Purva Mimamsa says that if you do such and such a thing, you will get such and such results. It is something yet to come and does not exist at the time. So no other proof is available regarding the truth of these statements except faith in them. But Vedanta speaks about Brahman, which is an already existing entity, and not dependent on human endeavour. Therefore besides faith in the scriptural texts there are other means available to corroborate its statements. That is why there is room for reasoning etc. in Vedanta. scriptures. mrreratfearcare. tt 3 mrea-Mifraty The scripture being the means of right knowledge. 1.1.8] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 29 3. The scriptures (alone) being the ineans of right knowledge (with regard to Brahman. the proposition laid in Sutra 2 becomes corroboratcd). This Sutra makes ihe idea expressed in Sutra 2 clearer. If{ any doubt has been left regarding the fact that Brahman as the origin ete. of the world is established by scriptural authority and not by inference ctc. independently of it, this Sutra makes it clear that Srutis alone are proof about Brahman. Objection: Brehman is an already existing thing like a pot, and so It can be known by other means of right knowledge independently of the scriptures. Answer: Brahman has no form etc. and so can- not be cognized by direct perception. Again in the absence of inseparable characteristics, as smoke is of fire, It cannct be established by inference or analogy (Upamina). Therefore, It can be known only through the scriptures. The scriptures themselves say, ‘‘One who is ignorant of the scriptures cannot know that Brahman’’. No doubt, as already referred This Sutra can also be interpreted in another wey. It has been said in Sutra 2 that Brahman, which 1s the cause of this manifold universe, must naturally be omnis- cient. This Sutra corroborates it. In that case it would read: ‘(The omniscience and omnipotence of Brahman follow from Its) being the source of the scriptures.” The scriptures declare that the Lord Himself breathed forth the Vedas. S« He who has produced these scriptures contain- ing such stupendous knowledge cannot but be omniscient and omnipotent. to in the previous Sutra, these means of right know- ledge also have a scope, but it is only after Brahman is established by the scriptures—as supplementary to them and not independent of them. Vedanta teats. TI AAAI 8 aq That g but waanq because It is the main purport. 4. But that (Brahman is to be known only from the scriptures and not independ- ently by any other means is established) because It is the main purport (of al) Vedanta texts). Objection by Purva Mimdémsakas: The Vedanta texts do not refer to Brahman. The Vedas cannot possibly aim at giving information regarding such self-established, alréady existing objects like Brahman, which can be known through other sources. They generally give information only about objects that cannot be known through other means of right knowledge, and about the means to attain such objects. Again Brahman, which is our own Self, can neither be desired nor shunned and as such cannot be an object of human effort. So a mere statement of fact about an existing object like Brahman, incapable of being desired or shunned and therefore useless, would make the scriptures purposeless. 1.1.4] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 31 Vedic passspes have a meaning only in so far as they are related to some action. So the Vedanta texts, to have a meaning, must be so construed as to be connected with action (rituals), as supplementing them with some necessary information. The texts dealing with the individual soui in the Vedanta, therefore, refer to the agent; those dealing with Brahman refer to the Deities; and those dealing with creation refer to spiritual practices (Sadhands). In that case, being supplementary to actiou, the Vedanta texts wil] have a purpose. But if they are taken to refer to Brahman only, they will be meaningless, inasmuch as thev will not be helpful to any action. Answer: The word but ir the Sutra refutes all these objections. The Vedanta texts refer to Brahman «..!y, for all of them have Brahman for their main topic. The main purport of a treatise is gathered from the following characteristics: (1) Beginning and _ conclusion, (2) repetition, (3) uniqueness of subject-matter, (4) fruit or result, (5) praise, and (6) reasoning. These six help to arrive at the real aim or purport of any work. In chapter six of the Chhandogya Upanishad, for example, Brahman is the main purport of all the paragraphs; for all these six characteristics point to Brahman. It begins, ‘“‘This universe, my boy, was but the Real (Sat), in the beginning’? (Chh. 6.2.1), and concludes by saying, “‘In it all that exists has its self. It is true. It is the Self’? (Ibid. 6.15.2)— $2. BRAHMA-SUTRAS [1.1.4 which also refers to the Sat or Brahman. In the frequent repetition, ‘‘You art That, O Svetaketu’’, the same Brahman is referred to. The uniqueness of Brahman is quite apparent, as It cannot be realized either by direct perception or inference in the absence of form ete. and characteristics respect- ively. Reasoning also has been adopted by the scriptures here by citing the example of clay to elucidate their point. As different objects are made out of clay, so are all things created from this Brahman. The description of the origin of the universe from Brahman, and of its sustenance by and reabsorption in It is by way of praise (Artha- vada). The result or fruit (Phala) is also mentioned, wiz. that through the knowledge of Brahman every- thing else is known. When we realize Brahman the universal Reality, we know all the particulars involved in It. So all these six characteristics go to show that the main topic of the Vedanta texts, as cited above, is Brahman. Again, these texts cannot be made to refer to the agent etc., for they are treated in quite a different section from the Karmakanda. Neither are the texts useless, for from the comprehension of these texts results Liberation, without any reference to action on the part of the person, even as a mere statement that it is a rope and not a snake helps to destroy one’s illusion. A mere intellectual grasp of the texts, however, will not help the person to attain Liberation; actual realization is what is meant here. 1.1.4] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 38 Oljection: The scriptures have a purpose in sv far as they lay down injunctions for man. They either induce him to or prohibit him from some action. The very mcaning of the word ‘Sastra’ is this. Even the Vedanta texts are related to injunctions and thus bave a purpose. For though they have Brahman for their main purport, yet they do not end there, but after describing the nature of Brahman they enjoin on man to realize Brahman through intuition. ‘‘The Self is to be realized——to be heard of, thought abcut, and meditated upon’’— in passages like this the scriptures, after enjoining on man tc be conversant first with the nature of Brahman, further enjoin thinking and meditation on the meaning of those passages for the attainment of direct experience. Thus they formulate injunctions with regard to the knowledge of Brahman. Answer: ‘He who knows the Supreme Brahman becomes Brahman indeed’? (Mu. 3. 2. 9)—texts like this show that to know Brahman is to become Brahman. But since Brahman is an already existing entity, we cannot say that to know. Brahman involves an act, like a ritualistic act, having for its result Brahman. When ignorance is removed Brahman manifests Itself, even as when the illusion of the snake is removed the rope manifests itself. Here the rope is not the creation of any act. The identity of the individual soul and Brahman set forth in texts like, I am Brahman’’ (Brih. 1. 4. 10), 1s not a fancy or imagination, but an actuality, and therefore differs from meditation and devout worship as prescribed by the scriptures in texts like, ‘‘One should meditate on the mind as Brahman’’, and ‘The Sun _ is Brahman’’ (Cbh. 3. 18. 1; 8. 19. 1). The knowledge of Brahman, therefore, does not depend on human endeavour, and hence it is impossible to connect Brahman or the knowledge of It with any action. Neither can Brahman be said to be the object of the act of knowing; for there are texts like, “‘It is differ- ent from the known, again It is beyond the unknown’’ (Ken. 1, 4), and ‘Through what, O Maitreyi, can the knower be known?” (Brih. 2. 4. 14). In the same way Brahman is denied as an object of devout wor- ship (Upasana)—‘‘Know that alone to be Brahman, not that which people adore here’? (Ken. 1. 5). The scriptures, therefore, never describe Brahman as this or that, but only negate manifoldness which is false, in texts like, ‘‘There is no manifoldness in It’”’ (Kath. 2. 4. 11), and ‘‘He who sees manifoldness in It goes from death to death’? (Kath. 2. 4. 10). Moreover, the result of action is either creation, modification, purification or attainment. None of these is applicable to the knowledge of Brahman, which is the same thing as Liberation. If Liberation were created or modified, it would not be permanent, and no school of philosophers is prepared to accept such a contingency. Since Brahman is our Inner Self, we cannot attain It by any action, as a village is attained by our act of going. Nor is there any 1.1.4] BRAHMA-SUOTRAS 35 room for a purificatory ceremony in the eternally pure Self. Knowledge itself, again, cannot be said to be an activity of the mind. An action depends upon human endeavour and is not bound up with the nature of things. It can either be dune, or not done or modified by the agent. Knowledge, on tne other hand, does not depend upon hrman notions, but on the thing itself. It is the result of the right means, having for its objects existing things. Knowledge cam therefore neither be made, nor not made, nor modified. Although mental, it differs from such meditiutions as ““Man is fire, O Gautama’’, ‘‘Woman is fire’’, ete. Thus Brahman or the krowledge of Brahman being in no wav connected with action, injunctions have no place with regard to It. Therefore texts like, ‘‘The Atman is to be realized’’ etc., though imperative in character, do not lay down any injunc- tion, but are intended to turn the mind of the aspirant from things external, which keep one bound to this relative existence, and direct it inwards. Further it is not true that the scriptures can have a purpose if only they enjoin or prohibit some action, for even by describing existing things they serve a useful purpose, if thereby they conduce to the well- being of man, and what can do this better than the knowledge of Brahman, which results in Libera- tion? The comprehension of Brahman _ includes hearing, reasoning, and meditation. Mere hearing does not result in full comprehension or realization of Brahman. MJeasoning and meditation are also subservient to that full comprehension. Hence it cannot be said that they are enjoined. If after full comprehension Brahman was found to be related to some injunction, then only it could be said to be supplementary to action. So Brahman is in no way connected with action. All the Vedanta texts deal with an independent topic, which is Brahman, and these texts are the only proof of this Brahman, as it is not possible to know It through any other source.: So far it has been shown in the previous Sutras. that all the Vedanta texts refer exclusively to Brahman without any connection whatsoever with action, and that Brahman is the omniscient, omni- potent cause of the origin etc. of this universe. Here the Sankhyas raise an _ objection: The Vedanta texts abéut creation do not refer to Brahman but tothe unintelligent Pradhana made up of the three Gunas (constituents)—Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, as the First Cause. The Pradhana is omnipotent with respect to its effects. Again the Pradhana has Sattva for one of its components, of which, according to Smriti (Gita 14. 17), knowledge is an attribute. Therefore the Pradhana can figuratively be said to be omniscient, because of its capacity for all knowl- edge. To Brahman, on the other hand, which is isolated and pure intelligence itself, you cannot 1.1.5] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 37 ascribe all-knowiagness or partial-knowledge. More- over, as the Pradhana has three components, it seems reasonable that it alone is capable of undergoing modifications, like clay, into various objects of name and form, and not Brahman, which is uncompounded, homogeneous and unchangeable. Moreover, the First Cause is au already existing entity and so can be established by inference from its effects and even the scriptures recommend inference of the cause from the effect. So what the Vedanta texts about creation say with respect to the First Cause holds good, and more aptly sc, in the case of the Pradhana, and therefore it is the First Cause referred to by the scriptures. principle. Sutras 5-11 refute these arguments of the Sankhyas and establish Brahman as the First Cause. The discussicn mainly refers to the sixth chapter of the Chhandogya Upanishad. CAAT, ANTAL | & I saa: On account of thinking (seeing) 4 is not “meq not based on the scriptures. 5. On account of thinking (being attributed to the First Cause by the scrip- tures, the Pradhana) is not (the First Cause referred to by them); it (Pradhana) is not based on the scriptures. The First Cause is said, in the scriptures, to have willed or thought before creation. ‘This universe, my dear, was but the Real (Sat) in the beginning—One only without a second. It thought, ‘may I be many, may I grow!’ and It projected fire (Chh. 6. 2. 2-3). “It (the Atman) willed, ‘Let me project worlds!’ So It projected these worlds’’ (Ait. 1. 1. 1-2). Such thinking or willing is not possible to the insentient Pradhana. It is possible only if the First Cause is an intelligent principle like Brahman. The all-knowingness attributed to the Pradhana because of its Sattva component is inadmissible, as Sattva is not predominant in the Pradhana, since all the three Gunas are in a state of equilibrium. If in spite of this it is said to be capable of producing knowledge, then the other two Gunas must be equally capable of retarding knowledge. So while Sattva will make it all-knowing, Rajas and Tamas will make it partly knowing, which is a contradiction. That all-knowingness and creation are not possi- ble to Brahman, which is pure intelligence itself and unchangeable, is also not true. For Brahman can be all-knowing and creative through Maya. So Brahman, the Sat of the text quoted, which thought, is the First Cause. The Sankhyas again try to avoid the difficulty created by thinking being attributed to the First Cause thus: In the same text quoted above it is said further on, ‘‘That fire thought, ‘may I be many, may I grow!’ and it projected water.... Water 1.1.6{ BRAHMA-SUTRAS 39 thought,... it projected earth’? (Chh. 6. 2. 3-4). Here fire and water arc material things, and yet think- ing Is aitributec to them. Similarly the thinking by the Sat (Rea), in the text originally quoted, can also be taken figuratively, in which case the Pradhana, though insentient, can yet be the First Cause. This argument the following Sutra refutes. aTorste, a, StTeAMEaTa & mu: Secondary (figuretive) 3q if (it be said) 4 not Sawelq becausc of the werd ‘Self? (Atman). 6. Tf it be said (that ‘thinking’) is used in a secondary sense (with regard to Sat); (we say) not so, because of the word ‘Self? (by which the First Cause is referred to in the scriptures). ‘he Sat (Real) of the text cited in the previous Sutra after ereating fire, water, etc. thought, ‘‘Let me now entcr into these three as this living self (Jiva) and evolve names and forms’’ (Chh. 6. 3. 2.). The Sat, the First Cause, refers to the intelligent principle, the Jiva, as its self. The insentient Pra- dhana cannot refer to an intelligent principle like the Jiva as its self or as its own nature. The Sankhyas again try to ward off this objection by saying that the word ‘Self? (Atman) is equally used to refer to intelligent and non-intelligent things, as, for example, in expressions like Bhutaéatma (the self of the elements), Indriyatma (the self of the senses), etc., and so can be used in connection with the Pradhana also. The next Sutra refutes this argument. aferger atemtazareg tl 8 afaze To one who is devoted to that ( Sat ) aawemq because Liberation is declared. 7. (That Pradhana cannot be desig- nated by the word ‘Self’ is established) be- cause Liberation is declared to one who is devoted to that Sat (the First Cause). The sixth chapter of the Chhandogya Upanishad ends by instructing Svetaketu thus: ‘You art that.”? An intelligent being such as Svetaketu cannot be identified with the insentient Pradhana. More- over, in section 14, paragraphs 2-3 of this chapter, Liberation is said to result to one who is devoted to this Sat, and it cannot result from meditation on the insentient Pradhana. For these reasons, given in the previous Sutra and in this, the ‘Sat.’ the First Cause, does not refer to the Pradhana but to an intelligent principle. SACATTAATS | < 1 vaaiaama Fitness to be abandoned not being stated (by the scriptures) 4 and. 8. And because it is not stated (by the scriptures) that It (Sat) has to be abandoned, (Pradhana cannot be denoted by the word ‘Sat’). 1.1.9] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 41 If tae intention of the scriptures had been to take the aspirant step by step from grosser to subtler truths tiil finally the real nature of the Atman was presented to him, and for this purpose they had referred to the Pradhéna—denoted by the word ‘Sat’ according to the Saénkhyar—as ihe Self, then there would have been later on a statement to the effect that this Pradhane must be dropped, for it was not the real Self. But there is no such statement in the texis In question. On the contrary, the whole chap- ter of the Chhandogya Upanishad, in which the texts occur, deals with the Self as nothing but that Sat. Moreover, this chapter begins with the question, “What is that which being known everything is known?’’ Now if the Pradhana were the First Cause, then by knowing it everything would be known, which is not a fact. The enjoyer (Purusha}, which is different from it, not being a product of the Pradhana like the objects of enjoyment, cannot be known by knowing the Pradhana. Therefore the Pradhana is not the First Cause, knowing which everything is known, according to the scriptures. Such a view will contradict the premise. SATCTATA tt & Ut aimqq On account of resolving or merging in one’s own Self. 9. On account of (the individual soul) merging in its own Self (or the universal Self referred to as the Sat, in deep sleep, the Pradhana cannot be denoted by the word ‘Self’). ‘‘When a man is said to be thus asleep, he is united with the Sat, my child—he merges in his own Self’? (Chh. 6. 8. 1). Here it is taught that the individ- ual soul merges in the Sat, and as it is impossible for the intelligent soul to merge in the imsentient Pradhana, the latter cannot be the First Cause denoted by the word ‘Sat’ in the text. TeATATRATA | Lo Il afaarareana On account of the uniformity of views. 10. Because (all the Vedanta texts) uniformly refer to (an intelligent principle as the First Cause, Brahman is to be taken as that Cause). scriptures themselves say, ‘‘Whom all the Vedas proclaim’? (Kath. 1. 2. 15). TACATS ll Lk tl gqaaiq Being declared by the Vedas 4 also. 11. (The all-knowing Brahman alone is the First Cause of this world) because (it is so known directly) from the Vedas also. “‘He is the Cause, the Lord of the ruler of the sense organs (Jivatman) and has neither parent. 1.1.11] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 43 nor Lord’’ (Svev. 6. 9)—whcre ‘He’ refers to the all- knowing Lord described in that chapter. Therefore it is established that the omniscient, omnipotent Brahman 1s the First Cause and not the insentent Pradhana or anything else. From Sutra 12 onwards till practically the end of the first chaptcr a new topic is taken up for discussion, viz. whether certain terms found in the Upanishads ure used in their ordinary senses or as referring to Brahman. Again the Upanishads speak of two types of Brahman, the Nirguna or Brahman without attributes and the Saguna or Brahman with attributes. It is the latter which is within the domain of Nescience end is the object of meditation (Upasana). which is of different kinds yielding different results; while the Nirguna Brah- man, which is free from all imaginary limit- ing adjuncts of the other type is the object of Knowledge. Meditation on the Saguna Brahman cannot lead to immediate Liberation. It can at best lead to gradual Liberation (Krama-Mukti). The knowledge of the Nirguna Brahman alone leads to immediate Liberation. Now in many places in the Upanishads Brahman is described apparently with qualifying adjuncts; yet the scriptures say that the knowledge of that Brahman leads to immediate Liberation. If Brahman is worshipped as limited by those adjuncts, it cannot lead to such Liberation. But if these qualifying adjuncts are regarded as not being ultimately aimed at by the Sruti, but used merely as indicative of Brahman, then these very texts would refer to the Nirguna Brahman and Libera- tion would be the immediate result of knowing that Brahman. So by reasoning we have to arrive at a conclusion as to the true significance of these texts, which obviously have a doubtful import. The issue of the Saguna and Nirguna Brahman as shown above is not, however, kept up all through, for in many places it is not between them but bet- ween the Saguna Brahman and the individual soul or something else. ATAPAAA SATATA tl 22 wereaa: “The Self consisting of bliss’? wareq because of the repetition. 12. (In the passage) “The Self con- sisting of bliss” etc. (Brahman, which is spoken of as the tail, is put forward as an independent entity and not as something subordinate to Anandamaya, the Self con- sisting of bliss) on account of the repeti- tion (of Brahman as the main topic in many passages of that chapter). In topic 5 the word ‘thinking’ attributed to the First Cause is interpreted in its direct sense, thus establishing the intelligent principle Brahman as the First Cause, and the figurative meaning, which would 1.1.12] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 45 have established the Pradhana, is thrown out as being doubtful. But here such a thing, that is the estab- lishing of Brahman, is impossible, for the terms aenoting parts allow no room for doubt, thus making it impossible to interpret the texts as referring to Brahman. This connects the preseut topic with the last one by way of objection. The passage in cuestion is: ‘Different from this self, which consists of understanding (Vijn4- namuaya), is the inner self which consists of bliss.... Joy is the head, satisfaction is its right wing, rap- ture is its left wing, bliss is its trunk, Brahman is the tail, the support”? (Taitt. 2. 5). The Sutra says that here Brahman, which is spoken of as the tail, is treat- ed as an independent entity and 3s not to be taken as a part of “‘the self consisting of bliss,’’ for ‘tail’ here does not mean the limb, in which sense it is generally used, but the support of the individual soul made up of ‘‘the self consisting of bliss’’, as Brahman is the substratum of the imaginary individual soul. This conclusion is arrived at, because Brahman without any limiting adjuncts whatsoever is again and again reiterated in these Taittiriya texts. [Sutras 12-19 are interpreted by the Vrittikara (who is probably Upavarsha) as follows: The Taittiriya Upanishad 2. 1-4 after enumerating the selves consisting of food, vital force, mind, and understanding, speaks of ‘“‘the self consisting of bliss’? in the passage quoted above. (Taitt. 2. 5). The question is whether this refers to the individual soul or Brahman. The opponent holds that it refers to the individual soul, because the word ‘Ananda- maya’ denotes a modification and therefore cannot refer to Brahman, which is unchangeable. Moreover, five different parts are enumerated of this Ananda- maya, the self consisting of bliss; this is not possible in the case of Brahman, which is without farts. Sutras 12-19, according to this interpretation, main- tain that ‘Anandamaya’, the self consisting of bliss, refers to Brahman on account of the repetition of the word ‘Anandamaya’ in these Taittiriya texts. Repeti- tion has already been said to be one of the character- istics by which the subject-matter of a passage is ascertained. Brahman, again, has been proved to be the main topic of the Vedanta texts (Ch. ], Sec. 1, Sutra 4). Therefore ‘Anandamaya’ refers to Brahman. Moreover, the opening words of the second chapter of the Taittiriya Upanishad, ‘Truth, Knowledge, Infinity is Brahman’? (Taitt. 2. 1), and texts like, ‘‘He projected all this’? (Taitt. 2. 6), make it clear that Brahman is the topic. The termination ‘mayat’ is also not out of place in Brahman, for it is used here to denote an abundance of bliss. The possession of a body having parts 1s also ascribed to It, only because of the immediately preceding limiting condition, viz. the self consisting of understanding and does not really belong to It. Hence ‘‘the self consisting of bliss’’ is the highest Brahman. Sankara objects to this interpretation of the 1.1.13] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 47 Sutras and says that Anaudamaya cannot be the highest Brahmen. First of all, there is no justifica- tion, for suddvury changing the interpretation of the wfix ‘mayat’ from modification in the case of Vij- nanaiaya, Pranamaya, ete. in the preceding pass- ages to abunaance in tne ease of Anandamaya, so as to make this word refer to Brahman. Again the very idea of vreponderance or abundance of bliss suggests that there is alsu misery in it, hcwever slight. Such an idea with respect to Brahman is absurd. So Sankara replaces this interpretation of the Sutras, which Anandagiri attributes to the Vrittikara, by another, which we have reproduced above. ] faarenarafa Sq, 4, Tsay 23 faai as eater in, ‘‘One of them eats the sweet fruit’? (Mu. 8. 1. 1). This Sutra says it 1s neither, but the Supreme Lord, for the text says that in Him the whole of creation, movable and immvuvable, is reabsorbed. The fact that death, which destroys everything else, is swallowed up as a condiment, shows that the entire creation is referred to as His food. The Brahmanas and Keshatriyas are mentioned as mere examples, since they are the foremost of created beings. The eater of such a stupendous thing can be Brahman alone and none else. TATE || Lo I wacua From the context 4 and. 10. And because (Brahman) is the subject of the discussion. In an earlier text Nachiketas asks Yama: Tell me of that which you see as neither good nor bad action, as ncither effect nor -cause, as neither past nor future’? (Kath. 1. 2. 14). In this text Brahman is inquired into and Yama answers: ‘“‘l will tell you in brief—it is Aum’? (Kath. 1. 2. 15). Further on he says, “The Self is neither born nor does it die’’ (Ibid. 1. 2. 18), and finally concludes with the passage in which the eater is mentioned. All this clearly shows that Brahman is the topic, and therefore the ‘eater’ is Brahman. It also follows from the peculiar characteristic, viz. the difficulty to cognize It, which is referred to in the text under discussion. An objection may be raised on the ground that the scripture itself in another place denies that Brahman is the ‘eater’: ‘The other (Brahman) looks on without eating’’ (Mu. 8.1.1). But ‘eating’ in this text refers to the experience of pleasure and pain, while in the text under discussion it means the reabsorption of the universe at the time of dissolution, which the scriptures attribute to Brahman alone. of the heart are the individual soul and Brahman. ayer ofrsrarearat fe, agetara tl 22 tl yet cavity (of the heart ) afaet the two that have entered watt are the two selves (individual and Supreme) fe indeed aexatq because it is so seen. 11. The two that have entered into the cavity (of the heart) are indeed the individual self and the Supreme Self, because it is so seen. In the Katha Upanishad there occurs the passage, ‘Having entered the cavity of the heart, the two enjoy the reward of their works, in the body” (1. 3. 1). The question is whether the couple referred to are the individual soul and Brahman, or the individual soul and intellect (Buddhi). The opponent, follow- ing the argument of the previous topic, says it is 1.2.12] PRAHMA-SUTRAS 75 the latter. In th last topic the nearness of the word ‘death’ helped us to interpret ‘Brahmana’ and ‘Kshatriya’ as typical of the whole phenomenal world, similarly the nearness of the word ‘enjoy’ would make the two in the text refer to limited things like the individual soul and intellect. The Sutra refutes this and says that the couple referred to are the individual.oul and Brahman, for numerals denote things of the same class. When a cow is brought to us and we say, ‘‘Bring another’’, it means another cow. So ii with an intelligent self, the individual soul, another is said to enter the cavity of the heart, it must refer tc another of the same class, 1.€. to another sentient being, and not to the intellect (Buddhi), which is insentient. The fact that both are said to enjoy the fruits of actions, which cannot apply to the Highest Brahman, is thus explained: Sometimes the characteristics of one in a group are indirectly applied to the whole group, as when we say, The men with an umbrella’’, where only one has an umbrella and not the whole group. So here also, though it is only one that is enjoying the fruits of actions, both are so spoken off. Feraterorrar 1 82 tl faarrarg From the specification @ and. 12. And from the (distinctive) quali- ties (of the two mentioned in subsequent texts). The texts subsequent to the one under discussion mention the characteristics of the two that have entered the cavity of the heart, which show that these are the individual soul and Brahman. ‘‘Know that the soul is the charioteer’’ etc. (Kath. 1. 3. 8) and ‘He attains the end of the journey, that supreme state of Vishnu’’ (Ibid. 1. 3. 9), where the two are mentioned as the attainer and the goal attained, 4.€. as the Jiva and Brahman. In a previous passage also the two are spoken of as the meditator and the object of meditation. ‘‘The sage relinquishes joy and sorrow, having realized by meditation... that effulgent One... seated in the heart’? (Kath. In the last topic the reference to ‘two’ occuring at the beginning of the text discussed, was inter- preted to denote two of the same class, t.e. two sentient beings, and the entrance into the cavity of the heart, mentioned later on, was interpreted accordingly. The same line of argument should be used, says the opponent, to interpret the text of this topic. That is, the person in the eye ought to be taken as a reflection in the eye, as it occurs at the beginning of the text, and the subsequent mention of immortality, fearlessness, etc. ought to be ex- explained away, as praise or otherwise. The inverse method, i.e. taking these words to refer to Brahman and thus fixing the person in the eye to be Brahman, should not be followed. In this way the opponent 1.2.14] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 7 wants to show thet the argument of the previous one is defective, for it will launch us into difficulties with respect to other texts of the Sruti. BraT TATA: |] 23 I waz: Inside (the eye) 399%: on account of the appropriateness of (attributes). 13. (The person) inside (the eye is Rrahinan) on account of (the attributes meitioned therein) being appropriate (only to Brahman). ‘This person that is seen in the eye is the self. This is immortal and fearless; this is Brahman’”’ (Chh. 4. 15. 1). The question is whether the person referred to here is the reflection of a person in the eye, or the individual soul, or the sun, which helps. sight, or Brahman. The Sutra says that this person in the eye is Brahman, because the qualities, ‘im- mortal’, ‘fearless’, etc., mentioned here with respect to that person can be true only of Brahman, and they cannot be otherwise explained away. ENA oTGaTD | LS Il wiaifeagemqd Because abode etc. (7. e. name and form) are attributed to it 4 and. 14. And because abode etc. (i.e. name and form) are attributed to It (Brahman) (by other scriptural texts also, for the sake: of contemplation). 7% BRAHMA-SUTRAS [1.2.14 But, how can the all-pervading Brahman be in a limited space like the eye? The assignation of a definite locality to the all-pervading Brahman only serves the purpose of meditation (Upfasana). In other scriptural texts, the disc of the sun, the cavity of the heart, even the eye itself (Brih. 8. 7. 18) and similar pure spots have been prescribed as places for the contemplation of Brahman. So here it is pre- scribed that Brahman should be contemplated in the eye. Not only abode, but even name and form are attributed to Brahman for the purpose of meditation, as Brahman without attributes cannot be an object of contemplation. (Vide Chh. 1. 6. 6-7). gafafrerhrarnas 4 1 24 Il qafafye-sfireiiq On account of the reference (to Brahman) distinguished by bliss @ @ and, 15. And on account of the reference (in the passage to Brahman) distinguished by bliss (mentioned at the beginning of the Prakarana). “The vital energy is Brahman, bliss is Brahman, ‘the ether is Brahman’’ (Chh. 4. 10. 5)—so taught the fires to Upakosala Kamalayana about Brahman, and this same Brahman is further elucidated by his teacher as ‘the person in the eye’’. syata farce krarara tt &é ya suyfawen-afa The way of those who have realized 1.2.17) SRAHMA-SUTRAS 79 the Truth of the Upanishads wfrernq on account of the statement 7 also. 16. Also on account of the statement of the way (after death) of those who have known the Truth of the Upanishads (2.e. knowers of Brahman) (with reference to the knower of the person in the eye). The Devayana path or the path of the gods, by which a knower of Brahman travels after aeath and which is described in the Prasna Upanishad 1.10 and other scriptural texts, is referred to here. Since the knower of ‘‘the person in the eye’’ also goes by this path after death, and since it is known from scriptures that none other except the knower of Brahman goes by this paih after death, ‘‘the person in the eve’? must be Brahman. ATTCTATSH TAT AAT: | LO il waafea: Not existing always Wawa on account of the impossibility 4 and 4 not tat: any other. 17. (The person in the eye is the Supreme Self) and not any other (i.e. individual soul etc.) as these do not exist always; and on account of the impossi- bility (of the qualities of the person in the eye being attributed to any of these). The reflection in the eye, for example, does not exist always, nor can the qualities like immortality, fearlesness, etc., be appropriately ascribed to this reflection. So no other self except the Supreme Self is here spoken of as the person in the eye. In the last topic, while interpreting the person in the eye as Brahman it has been taken for granted that the eye is prescribed in Brih. 3. 7. 18 as an abode of Brahman for contemplation, and that therefore here also the eye is prescribed as an abode. The present topic takes up for discussion this text of Brihadaranyaka and establishes the conclusion that was taken for granted in the last topic. ada, afrearieg asteagzana il Re I wate The Ruler within weearey in the gods ete. aqA-AGEMWG on account of Its qualities being men- tioned. 18. The Ruler within of the gods and so on (is Brahman) on account of the qualities of that (Brahman) being men- tioned. ‘Do you know the Internal Ruler’’ ete. (Brih, 8. 7. 1); and again, ‘‘He who inhabits the earth, but is within it, whom the earth does not know,... is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self?’ (Brih. 8. 7. 8). The ‘Internal Ruler’? spoken of here is Brahman and not the individual soul endowed with Siddhis (powers) or the presiding deity, or anything else, for the characteristics of Brahman 1.2.20] | BRAHMA-SIUTRAS sr are mentioned in the concluding part of the text cited, wherein the Ruler is spoken of as identical with the individual soul and immortal, which can be true only of Brahman. He is also described in this section as being all-pervading, since he is inside and the Ruler within of evervthing, viz. the earth, the sun, water, fire, sky, the ether, the senses, eic., and this also can be true only of Braliman. a @ tala, AaSAASTNG tt LE Il a Neither @ and faq that which is mentioned in the (Saénkhya) Smriti vaa wé-wfarama because attributes contrary to its nature are mentioned. 19. And neither is (the Ruler within): that which is talked of in (Sankhya) Smriti (17.e. Pradhana), because attributes. contrary to its nature are mentioned (here). The Pradhana is not this “‘Internal Ruler’’, as. the attributes: ‘He is the immortal’’; ‘Sunseen but secing, unheard but hearing,’’ etc. (Brih. 3. 7. 28),. do not hold true of the non-iutelligent Pradhana. mrdiwa, saasty fe Atanas 1 Ro Ul mz: The individual soul 4 also (4 not ) 3¥a- wfy. (the followers of) both (the recensions—K&anwa and Madhyandina) fe for #@4 as different TW this (the Jiva) wad read. 20. Also the individual soul (is not the Ruler within), for this is read as different (from the Internal Ruler) by the followers of both (the recensions, viz. the Kanwa and Madhyandina Sakhas of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad). The negative ‘not’ is to be supplied from the last Sutra. He who dwells in knowledge”? etc.—says Brih. 3. 7. 22, Kanwa reading, where ‘knowledge’ stands for the individual soul, for it consists of knowledge. ‘‘He who dwells in the self’’—is the Madhyandina reading of the same passage, where ‘self’? stands for the individual soul. These quotations make it clear that in either reading the individual soul is spoken of as different from the ‘Internal Ruler’’, for it is the ruler of the individual soul also. Here again we should not forget that the differ- ence of the Internal Ruler, the Supreme Lord, and the individual soul is merely the product of Nescience. There is only one Self within, for two selves are not possible. But owing to limiting adjuncts the one Self is treated as if It were two. In the last topic the ruler within was interpreted as the Supreme Lord and not the Pradhana, for qualities like, ‘seeing’, ‘hearing’, etc., which are con- trary to the nature of the Pradhana, were present. 4.2.22] PRAHMA-SUTRAS 83 Now ceitain texts which do not mention such qualities so as to exc.iude the Pradhana are taken up for discussion. ageacariaayorant “aati: Re tt wemgeate-qua: Posscssor of qualities like invisi- bility ete. vata: on account of the qualities being mentioned. 21. The possessor of qualities like invisibility etc. (is Brahman) on account of (Its) characteristics being mentioned. “That which cannot be seen nor seized, which is without origin... eternal, all-pervading, omni- present, extremely subtle..., the source of all beings, which the wise behold’? (Mu. 1. 1. 6). The Being which is the source of all beings is not the Pradhana but Brahman, for qualities like ‘‘He is all-knowing, all perceiving’? (Mu. 1. 1. 9) are true only of Brahman and not of the Pradhana, which is non-intelligent. Obviously it cannot refer to the individual soul as it is limited. PANUASATaIMTAT RAT 22 Il fanea ee-quenral On accourt of the mention of characteristic qualities and differences 4 not sav the other two. 22. The other two (viz. the individual soul and.the Pradhana) are not (referred to in the passage), because the characteristics of Brahman and the difference (of the Being which is the source of all beings from the individual soul and the Pradhana) are mentioned. “That heavenly person is without body, com- prises the external and the internal, is birthless, with- out the vital force and without mind, pure, higher than the high Imperishable”’ (Mu. 2. 1. 2). Epithets like ‘heavenly’, ‘birthless’, ‘pure’, etc. apply to Brahman and not the individual soul, which considers itself limited, impure, corporeal, etc. ‘‘Higher than the high Imperishable (Pradhina)’’ shows that the source of all beings spoken of in the last Sutra is not the Pradhana but something different from it. SAAATATA I 3 Ul eq-gyqaqigiq Form being mentioned @ also. 23. Also because (its) form is men- tioned (the passage under discussion refers to Brahman). Subsequent to the text quoted in the previous Sutra we have the following text, ‘‘The Person indeed is all this—sacrifice, knowledge, etc.’’ (Mu. 2. 1. 10} which shows that “‘the source of all beings’’ referred to in the text under discussion, is none other than the Supreme Lord or Brahman, because it is the self of all beings. In the last topic a general quality like invisibility 1224) PRAHMA-SUTRAS 85 equally applicable to Brahman and the Pradhana was interpreted to refer to Brahman taking into consid- eration qualities like all-knuwingness etc. mentioned later on in the section. Following this argument the objector takes some t2xts for discussion and insists that the Vaisvanara referred to in them must be the ordinary fire in view of specifications like ‘‘the sup- port of sacrifice’? mentioned later on. Parat: qrarcormedfaaarsg tl Ws I aya: Vaisvanara aang we-faima because of the qualifying adjuncts to the common words (Vaisva- nara and self ). 24, Vaisvanara (is Brahman), be- cause of the qualifying adjuncts to the common words (‘Vaisvanara’ and ‘Self’). ‘But he who worships this Vaisvanara Self extending from heaven to the earth as identical with his own self, eats food in all beings, in all selves; of that Vaisvanara self Sutejas (heaven) is the head, the sun the eye’’, etc. (Chh. 5. 18, 1-2). Now what is this Vaisvanara Self? ‘Vaisvanara’ generally means fire, the presiding deity of fire and the gastric fire. ‘Self? refers to both the individual soul and the Supreme Self. Which of these is referred to in the passage? Whatever be the ordinary meaning of these two words, the Sutra says that here the Supreme Self is referred to, on account of the qualifying adjuncts to these words. The adjuncts are: Heaven is the head of this Vaisvanara Self, the sun its eyes, etc., and this is possible only in the case of the Supreme Self. Again the result of meditation on this Vaisvanara Self having the parts stated is the attainment of all desires, and freedom from all sin. (Vide Chh. 5. 24. 3). This also can be true if the Highest Self is meant. Moreover the chapter begins with the inquiry, ‘‘What is our Self? What is Brahman?’’—where the word ‘Brahman’ is used in its primary sense, and so it is proper to think that the whole chapter delineates Brahman. cada carafe 11 2% tt @qamd Described in the Smriti 9444 indicatory mark @!q must be #fa because. 25. Because that (cosmic form of the Supreme Lord) which is deseribed in the Smriti must be an indicatory mark (from which we arrive at the meaning of this Sruti text under discussion). The Smritis are interpretations of Sruti texts. So where a doubt arises as to the meaning of a Sruti the former may be consulted to throw light on the subject. The Smriti describes the cosmic form of the Supreme Lord as, ‘‘He whose mouth is fire, whose head is heaven,... whose ears are the regions— salutation to Him, whose body is the universe’’, which agrees with the description in the text under 1.2.26] | DRAHMA-SUTRAS 87 discussion. Hence we have to conclude that the Highest Lord is referred to in the text. meaifecatsea: sfagiara afa aa, a, aur gL oem, avara, Fela wana t= i wwifey: Because of the word and other reasons wa: inside yfawiata on account of (its) existing 4 and a not efa aq if it be said 4 not so am as such 24” vemq on account of the instruction to conceive it Wawa being impossible yaa as person Wf also vaq him 4 also wHae (they) describe. 26. If it be said that (Vaisvanara) is not (Brahman) because of the word (‘Vaisvanara’, which has a definite mean- ing, viz. gastric fire) and other reasons, and on account of its existing inside (which is true of gastric fire), (we say) not so, because there is the instruction to con- ceive (Brahman) as such (as the gastric fire), because it is impossible (for the gastric fire to have the heaven ete. for its head and other limbs) and also because (the Vajasaneyins) describe him (Vaisva- nara) as a person (which the gastric fire is not). Objection: The ordinary meaning of ‘Vaisva- nara’ is fire and the Sruti also says that it is seated ‘88 BRAHMA-SUTRAS [1.2.26 inside: ‘“‘He who knows this Vaisvanara abiding ‘within man”? (Sat. Br. 10. 6. 1. 11), which applies to the gastric fire only. Hence it alone, and not ‘Brahman, is referred to in the text under discussion. The Sutra refutes this objection firstly because the scripture here teaches the worship of Brahman ‘in the gastric fire by way of meditation (Upasana), even as in the passage, ‘‘Let a man meditate on the mind as Brahman’? (Chh. 8. 18. 1). Secondly because the gastric fire cannot have heaven for its head, and so on. Thirdly because Vaisvanara 1s wonceived as a person by the Vajasaneyins: ‘‘This Agni Vaisvanara is a person’? etc. (Sat. Br. 10. 6. 1. 11). Hence ‘Vaisvanara’ here refers to Brahman, which is all-pervading and can also be conceived of as a person. Ta OT A BAT Wa A I 29 Il wa ua For the same reason @ (is) not @aat deity ya element 7 and. 27. For the same reason (Vaisva- nara) is not the deity (fire) or the element (fire). For the same reason—as stated in the previous Sutra. arengeafadd afata: ee ara Directly wf even sfatie no contradiction aifafa: (so says) Jaimini. 1.2.30] BRAHMA-SUTRAS 89 28. Even (if by ‘Vaisvanara’ Brah- man is) directly (taken as the object of worship), there is no contradiction; (so says) Jaimini. In the last Sutra it was explained that medita- tion on Brahman in the gastric fire, taking it as a symbol, was taught. This Sutra says that ‘Vaisva- nara’ can be taken directly to mean Brahman as an object of contemplation, for ‘Vaisvanara’ is the ‘same as Visvanara, which means the universal man,.€. the all-pervading Brahman Itself. aifizoaafeargsaceen: |) 28 Ht whan: On account of manifestation «fa so WAT: (says) Asmarathya: 29. On account of manifestation—so says Asmarathya. The reference to Vaisvanara in the text under discussion as extending from heavens to the earth is explained here. Even though the Lord is all-pervad- ing, yet He specially manifests Himself as extending from heaven to the earth for the sake of the devotees. AJSIAA AT: |] Bo Il wqqa: For the purpose of constant remembrance melt: (so says) Badari. 30. For the purpose of constant remembrance—so says Badari. The Highest Lord may be called ‘‘measured by a span’? (to render.the term ‘Pradesamatra’ differently), because He is remembered through the mind, which is seated in the heart, and the heart is of the size of a span. arpafefa sfafa:, aut fe astafa 3k i aga: Because of imaginary identity